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ABSTRACT
This thesis suggests that commanders must accept the responsibility for intelligence as
a personal, inherent function of command. Commanders most dissatisfied with intelligence
least understand its function, capabilities, and limitations. They lack a thorough
understanding of intelligence, thus they fail to directly participate in the process, and their
involvement is critical to success. Intelligence doctrine—the foundation of instruction in
professional schools—fails to increase understanding and forcefully encourage the
commander's participation. This thesis further suggests that doctrine reinforces past and
present practices relating to intelligence, causing many commanders to fail to see
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A successful commander must be a good intelligence
officer
.
Lieutenant General Chamberlin, USA2
A . OVERVIEW
A successful combat intelligence effort depends on the
vital bond that exists between the commander and his intelli-
gence officer. Combat -experienced commanders and intelligence
officers who have had a close and successful relationship
surely know this statement to be true. A command may possess,
or have access to, the data that provides a near perfect
picture of the battlefield situation; however, the synthesis
of the information and determination with which the command
acts upon it depends largely on the quality of the relation-
ship between the commander and the intelligence officer.
Herbert J. Boasso, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, "Intelligence
Support to Operations: The Role of Professional Military Education,
Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, (October 1988) , Research Report No. AN-
ARI-88+1, quoted in Michael I. Handel, ed., Intelligence and
Military Operations
,
(London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1990), 21.
'Chamberlin, Lieutenant General, USA, forward to Intelligence
is for Commanders , by Lieutenant Colonels Robert R. Glass and
Phillip B. Davidson, USA (Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service
Publishing Company, 1948), i.
Commanders and intelligence officers work toward a common
purpose: the application of combat power at the decisive time
and place, to accomplish the mission at the lowest possible
cost. Although their opinions may diverge and disagreements
will occur, this task must underlay all interaction between
commander and intelligence officer. When this condition
exists, the nature of the relationship is such that, ". . .it
resembles a pair of shears, so joined in the middle that they
cannot be separated; often moving in opposite directions, yet
always punishing anyone who comes between them." 3
The commander-intelligence officer relationship can be
difficult to establish and delicate to maintain. Given the
importance of the command-intelligence team to the success of
the command in combat, one would expect the relationship to
establish itself as a matter of routine, yet such is not
always the case. "It is established as a result of a great
3Sydney Smith (1771-1845) as quoted by Lady Holland in Memoir,
ch.ll, 363; in The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations , 3d ed.,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 511. The entire quote
refers to a marriage. Field Marshal von Hindenburg made a similar
reference to his relationship with his first General Staff officer,
General Ludendorff, as "a happy marriage. . . . Thoughts and
actions merge, and the words of one man are often just the
expression of the thoughts and feelings of the other." Arguably,
the relationship between commander and operations officer and
commander and intelligence officer are slightly different; however,
the spirit is the same. Quoted in Christian O.E. Millotat, Oberst
i.G., German Army, "The Prussian German General Staff System and
Its Impact on the General and Admiral Staff Officers of the Federal
Armed Forces of Today," study project for the U.S. Army War
College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1991, p. 23.
deal of persistent, conscious effort, and is likely to
disappear when the effort is relaxed." 4 While this statement
may be true of the relationship between the commander and any
of his subordinates, it is especially applicable to the
commander and his intelligence officer. The accounts of
friction between command and intelligence fill chapters, and
in some cases, entire volumes of works. Recognizing that
intelligence officers contribute to this friction, the
commanders are nevertheless in the best position to influence
change. The focus of this study, therefore, is on the
commander.
B. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
This thesis suggests that commanders must accept the
responsibility for intelligence as a personal, inherent
function of command. Commanders most dissatisfied with
intelligence least understand its function, capabilities, and
limitations. They lack a thorough understanding of intelli-
gence, thus they fail to directly participate in the process,
and their involvement is critical to success. Intelligence
doctrine--the foundation of instruction in professional
schools--fails to increase understanding and forcefully
encourage the commander's participation. This thesis further
4Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World
Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), 180.
suggests that doctrine reinforces past and present practices
relating to intelligence, causing many commanders to fail to
see intelligence as a personal, inherent, function of command.
This thesis relies upon established theoretical and
historical works detailing the record of the past; current
doctrine of the U.S. Marine Corps; written and oral accounts
from Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM; and personal
observations and experience of the author as a regimental
intelligence officer in combat.
Section II provides an overview of theory on the nature
of war and its dominant characteristics. These factors
describe the complex nature of the environment within which
the command-intelligence relationship must function effective-
ly and the practical limits of intelligence. Discussion
includes the relationship between the Clausewitzian concepts
of friction and military genius, and how they relate to
intelligence
.
Section III introduces the responsibilities and functions
of the instruments which apply the theory of war in combat--
the commander and his principal staff. Central to the
importance of this section are the concepts of responsibility,
authority, and the relationship between command and intelli-
gence. Also included is a discussion of the unique status of
the operations officer.
Section IV reviews the record of the distant and recent
past in determining how consistently commanders view intelli-
gence as a personal, inherent, function of command. The focus
is on levels of understanding and direct participation by
commanders in the intelligence activities of their commands.
A recurring theme is that of responsibility and authority of
the commander. This is not to fix accountability for failure;
rather, it directs attention to the only individual with
authority equal to his responsibility, and therefore in the
best position to influence positive change--the commander.
Section V examines intelligence doctrine, primarily
represented by Fleet Marine Force Manual 3-20: Commander'
s
Guide to Intelligence , to determine its influence on past and
present practices relating to intelligence. This section
argues that doctrine reinforces the tendency of many command-
ers to view intelligence as separate and distinct from
command; in effect, transferring the tacit responsibility for
the command function of intelligence to the intelligence
officer
.
Section VI provides illustrations of that which current
Marine Corps doctrine lacks: guidance to the commander as to
how he can better fulfill his intelligence responsibilities.
This section provides an overview of the intelligence cycle.
It also discusses the importance of commander's guidance in
two phases of the cycle which are traditionally weak in terms
of guidance from the commander; direction and dissemination.
Section VII concludes the thesis and provides recommenda-
tions for future action.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF WAR
War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the
factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a
fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and
discriminating judgment is called for; a skilled intelli-
gence to scent out the truth.
Carl von Clausewitz 5
A. INTRODUCTION
Essential to a successful commander-intelligence officer
relationship is a complete understanding of the nature of war.
This is important for two reasons. First, both must under-
stand that the environment in which they must function
effectively is unmatched in complexity. Second, understanding
the most fundamental principles of war as they relate to the
command-intelligence relationship will define the practical
limits of intelligence; both will know what is possible and
what is not, and expectations will not exceed reality. This
5Carl von Clausewitz, On War , ed. and trans. Michael Howard
and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 101.
On War is the most widely recognized description of the nature of
war. Several other modern publications also provide graphic
descriptions of the complex nature of war, from the tactical to the
higher operational and strategic levels: S.L.A. Marshall, Men
Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War (Glou-
cester, MA: Peter Smith, 1978); John Keegan, The Face of Battle
(New York: The Viking Press, 1976); Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch,
Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: The
Free Press, 1990); and Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons
for Defense Planning (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,
1982) .
section of the thesis answers the following questions: What is
war, and what are its dominant characteristics? How do those
factors define the practical limits of intelligence? How does
the Clausewitzian concept of "military genius" as a means of
overcoming friction integrate with intelligence?" The intent
of this discussion is not to exhaustingly review every basic
theory on the nature of war, rather it is to describe the
complexity of the environment in which the commander and
intelligence officer must function.
B. THE ESSENCE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF WAR
Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1, Warf ighting , includes
the principal ideas of Carl von Clausewitz. In spite of the
160 years that have elapsed since On War appeared, the
fundamental concepts of Clausewitz remain valid today, as
evidenced by their significant influence on the doctrine of
the Marine Corps. Warf ighting defines the essence of war as,
"a violent clash between two hostile, independent, and
irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose itself on the
other.
"
b The salient components of that definition--violence,
and a contest of opposing wills— interact continually in a
complex and varied manner.
''Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force Manual 1:
Warf ighting (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
1989), 3. Also Clausewitz, 76-77.
8
Violence is the means by which the object in war is
achieved; by inflicting human casualties and material damage
on an opponent, he eventually succumbs to our will. War is
also an armed contest of opposing human wills; as such, it is
subject to the intricacies and inconsistencies of human
behavior. War is not action against an inanimate object; it
is against a living, reactive force, struggling to achieve the
same objective as its opponent. "Thus, I am not in control:
he dictates to me as much as I dictate to him. " 7 As a result
of the continuous interaction of independent, opposing, and
creative human wills, there is always a greater or lesser
degree of unpredictability inherent in war. The unpredictable
nature of war increases when either or both sides adopt such
methods as camouflage, deception, psychological operations,
night movements, electronic warfare, or high-tempo operations.
One or more of those activities--or an apparent lack of
activity--by one or both opponents, adds to the other's
difficulty in arriving at an accurate appreciation of the
situation. The outcome of conflict, therefore, is much more
complex than making a mathematical estimate of combat power.
History provides numerous examples of forces on the losing
'Clausewitz, 77
side of such estimates defeating their opponents. 8 Debilitat-
ing physical damage and casualties are not always a prerequi-
site for defeat; it is the effect of losses a command sustains
on the mind of the commander that results in defeat. "Posi-
tions are seldom lost because they have been destroyed, but
almost invariably because the leader has decided in his own
mind that the position cannot be held." 9 The answer to the
first question posed in the introduction of this section has
been answered; the essence of war is a violent clash of two
hostile, independent, and irreconcilable will, each trying to
impose itself on the other. Violence is the means by which
the object is achieved. Clausewitz continues his analysis to
discuss the dominant characteristics of war and determines
that there are four: physical exertion, danger, uncertainty,
and chance. 10
8Examples include: 20th Maine at Little Round Top, Gettysburg,
1863; Company B, 2d Battalion, 24th Foot at Rorke's Drift, South
Africa, 1879; 308th Infantry (The Lost Battalion), Argonne, France,
1918; German Campaign in France, 1940; 101st Airborne Division at
Bastogne, Belgium, 1944; and the 1st Marine Division in the retreat
from the Chosin Reservoir, Korea, 1950.
9A.A. Vandegrift, Major General, USMC, Battle Doctrine for
Front Line Leaders (Third Marine Division, 1944), 7; quoted in
Warf ighting , 1. Vandegrift was Commanding General of 1st Marine
Division on Guadalcanal. He was awarded the Medal of Honor and
later served as Commandant of the Marine Corps from 1944-1948.
10Clausewitz , 104. A discussion of each can also be found in
Warf ighting . Many other military theorists and authors mirror
image Clausewitz in this regard.
10
Clausewitz regards physical exertion in war as "the most
important unquantif iable factor because its limits are so
uncertain." 11 Fatigue and exhaustion impinge not only upon
physical readiness for battle, but mental readiness as well;
reaction time, judgment, and critical decision-making facul-
ties all suffer impairment from physical exertion. Perhaps
the most important psychological side-effect of fatigue is
that it can enhance one's sense of danger. 12
The obvious danger in war is that of injury, disfigure-
ment, or death; that of capture is no doubt a close second.
Danger stimulates anxiety and fear, often resulting in altered
judgment and behavior. Additionally, just as fatigue can
enhance the perception of danger, "sustained fear in the male
individual is as degenerative as prolonged fatigue, and
exhausts the body energy no less." 13 The factors of physical
exertion and danger combine to continually challenge one's
physical and mental faculties. The effects are greatest upon
the uninitiated: "The novice cannot pass through layers of
increasing intensity of danger without sensing that here ideas
11 Ibid., 117
120ne of the most vivid accounts of violence, physical
exertion, and danger in war, and their resulting affect on human
behavior is Guy Sajer, The Forgotten Soldier (Washington, D.C.:
Brassey's (US), Inc., 1990)
i:i S.L.A. Marshall, The Soldier's Load and the Mobility of a
Nation (Quantico, VA: The Marine Corps Association, 1980), iii .
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are governed by other factors, that the light of reason is
refracted in a manner quite different from that which is
normal in academic speculation." 14
Uncertainty is a major factor in war, and in the rela-
tionship between commander and intelligence officer. Uncer-
tainty is a constant companion in war, not only with regard to
the enemy situation, but also to the conditions of weather,
terrain, and the friendly situation. "We hardly know accu-
rately our own situation at any particular moment, while the
enemy's which is concealed from us, must be deduced from very
little evidence." 15 Clausewitz writes that "three-quarters
of all activity in war takes place in a fog of greater or
lesser uncertainty." 16 The questions that arise in the
effort to gain perfect information are seemingly endless: Will
the enemy defend in place, or withdraw? Will he employ
chemical weapons? Is our reconnaissance patrol experiencing
radio problems, or have they failed to report because they
have been ambushed? Will the weather permit a helicopterborne
assault tomorrow night? Can wheeled vehicles ford the river,
or will we need bridging equipment? Some of the endless
questions will be answerable, and some will not.
14Clausewitz, 113.
lsIbid., 217.
u Ibid., 140, 56.
12
Since the time of Clausewitz, the development and
increasing use of sophisticated information collection systems
has done much to reduce some aspects of uncertainty, but this
has also been the cause of new problems; Section VI below
discusses some of these problems. For the purpose of this
section of the study, it is important to recognize that
absolute certainty is fundamentally impossible to achieve in
war, and the Marine Corps still recognizes this today. "The
very nature of war makes absolute certainty impossible; all
actions in war will be based on incomplete, inaccurate, or
even contradictory information." 17
The final element that makes up the climate of war--
chance-- is also of special interest to this thesis because it
interacts so closely and frequently with uncertainty. The
continuous presence of uncertainty in war forces the partici-
pants to estimate and accept risk. In that context, risk is
gambling that you will be right--taking a chance. Chance also
consists of turns of events that cannot reasonably be foreseen
and over which neither side has any control. The uncontrolla-
ble potential for chance creates psychological friction. ls
Clausewitz recognizes that chance increases uncertainty and
interferes with all activity in war. "From the very start
17Warf ighting , 6
ly Ibid., 7.
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there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good
luck, and bad. . 19 In the end, chance reduces the
accuracy and predictive value of information, resulting in
unreliable intelligence. 20
The dominant characteristics of war--physical effort,
danger, uncertainty, and chance- -combine and interact continu-
ously to form the concept of friction; the force that resists
all action in war. Clausewitz describes friction as "the only
concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that
distinguish real war from war on paper." 21 Friction appears
in several forms
.
Uncertainty, fear, or indecision can cause mental
friction; external sources, such as enemy action or extremes
of weather and terrain can create friction; organizations can
also create self-induced friction by such factors as over-
complicated command and control procedures, lack of coordina-
tion and cooperation, and rules of engagement inappropriate to
the tactical situation. .Friction will always have a psycho-
logical as well as a physical impact, because war is a human
endeavor. 22 Friction, like uncertainty, is impossible to
"Clausewitz, 85-6, 101.
20Michael I. Handel, ed . , Clausewitz and Modern Strategy
London: Frank Cass & Company, Limited, 1986), 118.
•:1 Ibid., 119.
22Warf ighting , 5 .
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completely eliminate in war. The greater requirement, there-
fore, is to adopt practices that reduce its psychological
impact. S.L.A. Marshall wrote in 1947 that, ". . .it becomes
a necessary part of the young officer's mental equipment for
training to instill in him the full realization that in combat
many things can and will go wrong without it being anyone's
fault in particular.""' 3 Critical information is slow in
arriving, is inaccurate or misinterpreted, or it never arrives
at all; supplies are delayed; a vital piece of equipment
breaks down, or is destroyed in a chokepoint, inhibiting
further progress; orders are misunderstood and improperly
executed; ordnance becomes stuck on aircraft weapon stations
and will not release; casualties result from friendly fire;
and so on. The possibilities are limitless.
The effects of friction accumulate. "Countless minor
incidents--the kind you can never really foresee--combine to
lower the general level of performance, so that one always
falls short of the intended goal." 24 For example, the scheme
of maneuver in an operations order, however brilliant in
conception, is generally nothing more than a common basis for
change. The words of von Moltke the Elder still hold true
today: "No plan of operations can look with any certainty
^Marshall, Men Against Fire , 116.
JlClausewitz, 119.
15
beyond the first meeting with major forces of the enemy. . .
All consecutive acts of war are, therefore, not executions of
a premeditated plan, but spontaneous actions. . . . "~ 5 The
components of friction and the independent will of the enemy
interact continually to alter the best laid plans. In short,
mistakes and unforeseen events are commonplace, and no amount
of detailed planning and careful preparation can completely
forestall the influence of friction. However mild or severe
in degree, disorder is the normal state of affairs in war. 26
What fundamental principle can be extracted from the preceding
description of the nature of war and serve as a basis for
understanding and continued discussion?
The influence of violence on human behavior and the
complex interaction of opposing wills makes war a fundamental-
ly unpredictable activity." 7 That part of friction caused by
uncertainty and chance has proven invulnerable to the best
efforts of mankind to eliminate it and survives to this day;
Operation DESERT STORM provides several good examples. Will
25Hajo Holborn, "The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise
of the General Staff, " in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machia-
velli to the Nuclear Age , e.d. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ
:
Princeton University Press, 1986), 289. Also in Warf ighting , 9:
"Each encounter in war will usually tend to grow increasingly
disordered over time. As the situation changes continuously, we
are forced to improvise again and again until finally our actions
have little, if any, resemblance to the original scheme."
""Warf ighting , 9 .
~ 7Clausewitz, 86, 90, 139-140; Warfighting , 4, 6.
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the Iraqis employ chemical weapons? How will the Iraqi Air
Force respond to the air campaign? Where and when will the
Republican Guards divisions counterattack, if at all? There
is little doubt that one of the big questions in the mind of
the Iraqis was, "Will the American Marines conduct an amphibi-
ous assault into Kuwait?" The uncertainty those questions
create stimulates a considerable amount of friction because
none of them could be definitively answered, nor will be
similar questions in future conflicts. All of these questions
deal with intent; a thought or concept that exists only in the
mind of the opposing commander. One can estimate what the
intent of his opponent is, based on the activities of his
forces; however, nothing is more subject to change in what can
be a matter of seconds. Plans and objectives are subject to
change caused by enemy action, orders from a superior,
disobedience of orders, fleeting opportunities, and mistakes
of judgment. Friction is an unconquerable, inevitable,
condition of war; it must not be allowed to dominate the
command-intelligence relationship
.
Commanders and intelligence officers who possess a mutual
understanding of the nature of war find the knowledge very
liberating in terms of how they view their respective respon-
sibilities. The impossible task of accurately predicting
future enemy actions all of the time, is cast aside. Ralph
Peters wrote that one of our "prime cultural biases" as
17
Americans is that all things are knowable. "Our most obnox-
ious assumption--and one that has been painfully disproven
over and over again--is that the dynamics of human. . . behav-
ior are thoroughly quantifiable." 28 When that assumption is
successfully eliminated, there is no wasted energy trying to
overcome inevitable difficulties and the focus of attention
and effort remains where it should be--on the enemy.
C. FRICTION VERSUS GENIUS
The Marine Corps accepts the basic concepts of Clausewitz
as valid today, in spite of the enormous advances in the
physical and technical means of war that have taken place over
the last 160 years. Friction, and all its component parts
form a central element of those basic concepts. Another
central element is that war is still "an activity of human
creativity and intuition powered by the strength of the human
will." 29 In any military organization, the center of that
activity is the commander. He provides part of the counter-
force that can overcome the debilitating effects of friction--
"military genius." What is genius? How does genius overcome
friction? What is the relationship of genius to intelligence?
Clausewitz describes genius as,
JBRalph Peters, "Intelligence Failures and the Limits of




Any complex activity, if it is to be carried on with any
degree of virtuosity, calls for appropriate gifts of
intellect and temperament. If they are outstanding and
reveal themselves in exceptional achievements, their
possessor is called a genius. 30
Genius requires "the intuitive ability to grasp the
essence of a situation, the creative ability to devise a
practical solution, and the strength of purpose to execute the
act." 31 The central qualities of intellect and temperament
"indispensable in a commander are character, intuition, and
determination. " 32
Strength of character is the ability to maintain balance
"during times of exceptional stress and violent emotion, " and
includes presence of mind as "an increased capacity for
dealing with the unexpected." 33 S.L.A. Marshall writes that,
"The test of fitness to command is the ability to think
clearly in the face of unexpected contingency or opportuni-
ty." 34 The nature of war makes this very difficult to
accomplish, thus the reason for the premium placed on this
attribute. "In the dreadful presence of suffering and danger,
emotion can easily overwhelm intellectual conviction, and in
30Clausewitz, 100.
J1Warf ighting , 15.
32Clausewitz, 102, 104.
5i Ibid., 103, 105.
i4Marshall, Men Against Fire , 117.
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this psychological fog it is . hard to form clear and
complete insights. . . ." 35 Strength of character is the
attribute that absorbs the tremendous shock combat delivers to
the mind of the commander; it is also the foundation of the
faculties that permit him to deliver an effective counterblow.
This is the foremost of attributes desirable in a commander,
for without it, intuition and determination could not emerge
to function.
Intuition is the ability to look at a military situation
and immediately see its essence, especially the key enemy
weakness or weaknesses which, if exploited, can lead to a
decision. 36 Intuition is seldom a natural ability, but one
that develops through experience under pressure and constant
study. Every action in war is the result of a unique combina-
tion of circumstances, and requires an original solution.
Moreover, each action is influenced by those that preceded it,
and those that follow. 37 The commander is the one who must
35Clausewitz, 108.
"Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force Manual
1-3: Tactics (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
1991), 16. Also Clausewitz, 102. Clausewitz uses the French term,
coup d'oeil, which translated literally means, "stroke of the eye."
It refers to "the quick recognition of a truth that the mind would
ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study and
reflection
.
j7Warf icrhtmq , 8 .
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evaluate all of the factors and apply his intuition to
formulate a solution unique to the present situation.
Once intuition recognizes the essence of the situation,
creativity must devise a solution appropriate to the circum-
stances; this too, is a difficult task. The demand on the
intellect at this point is more than an appreciation of what
is possible and what is not; the greater requirement is to
establish the purpose of the engagement in terms of its
effects on the enemy. "When one comes to the effect of the
engagement, where material success turns into motives for
further action, the intellect alone is decisive. 38 Planning
and executing a maneuver to secure an objective is relatively
easy; the point that Clausewitz makes is that the commander
must phrase his intent in terms that translate into a decisive
effect on the enemy.
Determination in one sense is physical courage-- "the
highest of moral qualities in time of danger." 39 In the
context of genius, Clausewitz is referring to the courage
necessary to accept responsibility in time of danger. He
writes that the purpose of determination is "to limit the




for action are inadequate." 40 An act of temperament, deter-
mination requires the spark of intellect to bring it to life;
"the mind tells a man that boldness is required and thus gives
direction to his will." 41 Clausewitz provides a note of
caution, however; "This kind of boldness does not consist in
defying the natural order of things and crudely offending the
laws of probability; it is rather a matter of energetically
supporting that higher form of analysis by which genius
arrives at a decision: rapid, only partly conscious weighing
of the possibilities." 42
Personal attributes alone do not make a great commander,
however. Military education and practices relative to the
conduct of training exercises are vital components of genius.
"No activity of the human mind is possible without a certain
stock of ideas: for the most part these are not innate but
acquired, and constitute a man's knowledge." 43 Military
education, complemented by constant exercise of operational
40Ibid.
41 Ibid., 103.
42 Ibid., 192. Marshal Soult echoes this thought: "What we call
an inspiration is nothing more than a rapid calculation."; quoted
in Major General Baron von Freytag-Loringhoven, German Army, The
Power of Personality in War , translated in 1938 by the Historical
Section, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA; published




judgment under pressure are key to the formation of that stock
of ideas. Personal attributes and knowledge are absorbed and
become almost indistinguishable; together they form an
"intellectual apparatus that represent a genuine capability."
That capability then manifests itself in the application of
operational art in battle. 44
Clausewitz considers genius as the only means available
to overcome the negative effects of friction, but especially
with respect to the unreliability of intelligence, the quality
of which was limited by the technology of his time. The
increasing sophistication of intelligence since the early 19th
Century alters, but does not completely change, that view
today. Commanders still do not go to battle with perfect
information of the enemy, and seldom do they possess the
numerical and material superiority they would like; they may
even be at a disadvantage in all respects, relative to the
enemy. Such disadvantages can be overcome by brilliant,
aggressive leadership--military genius.
Rommel's campaigns in North Africa during World War II
are a good example. Outnumbered and outgunned, Rommel's
expertise in operational art--enhanced by skillful use of
intelligence—enabled his forces to win several victories.
Even after the combat loss of his principal intelligence
"Ibid., 147.
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source, 4 "' impossible supply problems, and lack of superiority
in virtually every measurable category, Rommel still was a
formidable opponent. This was due in large part to his
military genius. How does genius integrate with intelligence
to overcome friction?
As Michael I. Handel points out in Intelligence and
Military Operations , even genius requires intelligence in
order to make operational decisions. "... how does one side
know that it is superior to the other without intelligence;
and how does it know where to concentrate its forces, where
the enemy is located, and so on?" Rommel himself acknowledges
that it is not that one general is more brilliant or experi-
enced than the other; it is a question of which general has a
better appreciation of the battlefield. 46 Thus, genius is
neither rash boldness, nor guesswork. Intelligence, whether
45Rommel relied heavily upon Lieutenant Seebohm's Wireless
Intercept Section to provide him intelligence. The company was a
lucrative source, as British communication security procedures were
very lax. Seebohm and most of his unit were killed defending the
Panzer Army Headquarters on 10 July 1942; in F.W. von Mellenthin,
Major General, Germany Army, Panzer Battles: A Study of the
Employment of Armor in the Second World War (Norman, OK: University
of Oklahoma Press, 1956), 135. Von Mellenthin was Rommel's
intelligence officer in North Africa.
46Liddel B. Hart, ed., The Rommel Papers (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, & Company, 1953), 122. Quoted in Guillermo A. Rodriguez,
Major, USA, "Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield: Is it
Worth the Effort?", monograph for the School of Advanced Military
Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leaven-
worth, KA, 1991, 5.
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the commander acquires it through personal reconnaissance or
through an intelligence service, is inseparable from genius.
According to Handel, "The military genius' intuition cannot
replace intelligence; it can only function when it exploits
information more adroitly than others could.
"
47 He also
accurately describes how many officers today perceive excel-
lence in the operational art as a substitute for intelligence.
"Only one step away from ignoring the value of intelligence,
this attitude is perpetuated in the education of military
officers and thus later reflected in their long-standing
underestimation of its importance." 48 This point develops
clearly throughout the thesis.
D. SUMMARY
Understanding the nature of war and fundamental princi-
ples that derive from the dominant characteristics of war is
a prerequisite to a successful command-intelligence relation-
ship. The environment in which the relationship must function
effectively is unmatched in complexity. War is a violent
clash between armed belligerents, each determined to impose
its will on the other. Each will is free to employ the
physical means of force at its disposal to the limit of its
creativity, and the strength of the will is difficult, if not
47Handel, Intelligence and Military Operations , 14
43 Ibid., 21.
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impossible to assess. The dominant characteristics of war are
physical exertion, danger, uncertainty, and chance. The
interaction of these characteristics in war produces friction-
-the force that resists all action and makes the most simple
tasks difficult. As the affects of friction accumulate,
confusion and disarray increase, forcing the participants to
continually improvise and modify their actions in order to
maintain control and balance.
Military genius is part of the counter-force that
overcomes friction. Genius requires "the intuitive ability to
grasp the essence of a situation, the creative ability to
devise a practical solution, and the strength of purpose to
execute the act." Genius must have an appreciation of the
battlefield situation to act; it is neither rash boldness, nor
guesswork. Genius is not a substitute for intelligence, it
simply "exploits information more adroitly than others." Such
is the complex nature of the environment in which the command-
intelligence relationship must function effectively, and the
theory of how friction and uncertainty are overcome. The
instruments which apply theory in combat are the commander and
his staff.
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III. COMMAND AND STAFF FUNCTIONS
One of the surest ways of forming good combinations in
war would be to order movements only after obtaining
perfect information of the enemy's proceedings. As it is
unquestionably of the highest importance to gain this
information, so it is a thing of utmost difficulty, not to
say impossibility; and this is one of the chief causes of
the great difference between the theory and practice of
war
.
Antoine Henri Jomini 49
The role and function of commanding officers who make
decisions without any advice, only based on their opera-
tional and strategic genius is pure fiction. Military
planning and command and control have become too complex
to be handled by the leader on the top alone. In this
light it seems an archaic facade if one maintains this
fiction at all costs.
Colonel C.O.E. Millotat, German Army, 1991 50
A. INTRODUCTION
One should possess a basic understanding of the responsi-
bilities of the commander and the functions of principal staff
officers before discussing command and intelligence in more
detail. What is command? What is the role of the staff?
What is the relationship between their functions? In narrow-
ing down the focus to the commander and the intelligence
officer, this section also discusses the operations officer's
49Antoine Henri Jomini, The Art of War (Westport, CT: Greenwood




role in the command- intelligence relationship. The point of
reference here is commanders and staffs at level of Marine
infantry regiment and below. This description removes the
need for potentially confusing comparisons to such equivalent
Marine Air Wing units as " regiment /group" and "batta-
lion/squadron." Also, a common method of referring to a staff
officer at any level is, for example, G/S-2. The intelligence
officer of a general officer's staff is a G-2; for a regiment
or battalion, he is an S-2. The all-encompassing reference to
an intelligence officer from battalion up through a Marine
Expeditionary Force (MEF) as a G/S-2 will not be used except
when citing other authors.
B. DOCTRINAL COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS
Command is the exercise of authority over a military unit
by a single officer--the commander. Commensurate with the
authority to command is the responsibility for all that the
unit does or fails to do. Commanders may delegate a portion
of their authority to a subordinate for the execution of
certain tasks; however, the ultimate responsibility is the
commander's, and his alone. 51 This is in contrast to, for
example, the Prussian-German command system. Officers of the
German General Staff at all levels of command are accountable
'Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force Manual
3-1: Command and Staff Action (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S.
Marine Corps, 1966), 1-2.
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for the relevancy of their advice and bear joint responsibili-
ty with the commander. This custom is still the case to-
day. 52
Commanders at the battalion level and above have staffs
to advise and assist them in the exercise of command. Staff
officers provide information for, and submit recommendations
to, the commander. They advise other staff officers and
subordinates to the commander of his plans and policies;
assist those individuals in implementing them; and determine
the extent of implementation. Staff officers have no inherent
authority over subordinate units of the command, neither do
they possess any authority over staffs outside of the command.
The commander delegates authority to his staff for performance
of the technical details of staff work associated with differ-
ent functions of command.
The chief of staff is the executive officer, who is also
the deputy commander. He directs, coordinates and supervises
the activities of the staff. Principal staff officers advise
and assist the commander in four functions of command:
personnel and administration (S-l) ; intelligence (S-2);
operations and training (S-3); and logistics (S-4). r' These
-
,2Millotat, 23.
"Staffs of general officers designate the communications-
electronics officer as the G-6, and he is a member of the principal
staff. Regiments and battalions have communications officers;
however, they are not designated the S-6. In practice, they are
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areas include all of the activities necessary for the command
to sustain itself and to accomplish its mission. The officers
serving in those four positions share equal status, regardless
of their respective grades.
The commander may grant considerable authority to the
executive officer and the principal staff for them to perform
their duties. "Regardless of how much authority the commander
allows his staff, he alone retains responsibility." 54 In
practical terms, this statement means that a commander may
have absolute trust and confidence in the abilities of a staff
officer; so much so that the officer's actions and recommenda-
tions are seldom, if ever, the subject of scrutiny or ques-
tions by the commander. Such a circumstance is the goal of
every staff officer and the desire of every commander.
Nevertheless, the commander bears the ultimate responsibility
for the actions and recommendations of his staff. For
example, a staff officer recommends a course of a'ction to the
commander. When making his decision, the commander may
incorporate the verbatim recommendation; he may modify it to
a greater or lesser degree; or he may reject it out of hand.
Once the commander accepts the staff officer's course of
action, in whole or in part, the course of action becomes the
principal staff officers in virtually all respects except title.
c,4
Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Colonel, USMC (Ret), The Marine
Officer' s Guide (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1977), 367.
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commander's, and his alone. For this reason, shared trust and
confidence between commander and staff officer is of utmost
importance. For the same reason, staff officers should never
presume that they know all of the commander's motives for
thought and action. The commander sees situations differently
than his staff, and even the best executive officer or member




The nature of the duties inherent in the four principal
functions of command tends to form two distinct, but interde-
pendent groups: the first is administration and logistics, and
the second is intelligence and operations. Although the
commander is ultimately responsible for all four, it is common
practice for him to delegate his authority to the executive
officer for the direction and supervision of personnel (S-l)
and logistical (S-4) matters. This practice does not neces-
sarily preclude the executive officer from performing his duty
as chief of staff, nor does it necessarily preclude his
participation in intelligence (S-2) and operational (S-3)
matters. Executive officers frequently perform all of those
functions, and perform them very well. Much depends on the
preferences of the commander and the conditions of combat.
:
'-'Peter Morosoff, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, "Intelligence for
Commanders, " Marine Corps Gazette 74 (August 1990) : 67; also von
Freytag-Lormghoven, 147.
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Such an arrangement simply copes with the increasing scope and
complexity of commanding a modern combat unit in battle. It
allows the commander to devote more time to focus on leader-
ship and combat decisions, while the executive officer ensures
the necessary support is available to execute the commander's
will. Remaining are the officers that primarily--but not
exclusively--determine the activities that relate to maneuver
and fire support: the commander, the intelligence officer, and
the operations officer. Before discussing the dynamics of the
relationship between individuals, one should understand the
relationship between the functions they perform. What is the
connection between command and intelligence?
C. THE COMMAND- -INTELLIGENCE CONNECTION
The commander must consider four major variables before
adopting a plan, or concept of operations. These four
imponderables always appear in the same form, yet are never
identical to those in any previous situation. They are 1)
friendly capabilities and the ability of the 2) enemy, 3)
weather, and 4) terrain to influence the mission. Three of
the four variables to consider in operational decision-making
fall under the command function of intelligence.
Intelligence is the collection, analysis, and synthesis of
information relating to the enemy situation, as well as the
terrain, and the weather as they affect friendly operations.
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The purpose of intelligence is to reduce the unknown factors
of those three imponderables to the maximum extent possible.
In doing so, intelligence reduces uncertainty and risk by
describing the area of operations and the enemy situation,
particularly by identifying enemy strengths to avoid and
weaknesses to exploit; it is the commander's means of deter-
mining the decisive time and place to strike the enemy. 5b
Intelligence is therefore an essential component of combat
power. Combat power is the total destructive force one can
exert on an enemy at a given time. Components of combat power
may be tangible, such as numerical superiority in men and
equipment; some may be less tangible, such as intelligence
which indicates to the commander when and where to strike the
enemy; and some components are wholly intangible, such as an
enemy's willingness to fight. 57 The product of the compo-
nents equals the unit's combat power.
Operational plans logically develop from intelligence,
and this establishes the inextricable link between intelli-
S6Headquarters , U.S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force Manual
3-20: Commander's Guide to Intelligence (Washington, D .C . :Headquar-
ters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1991), 1-1; Headquarters, U.S. Marine
Corps, Fleet Marine Force Manual 3-21: MAGTF Intelligence Opera-
tions (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1991), 1-
1. These two publications contain intelligence doctrine for the
Marine Corps. A MAGTF is a Marine Air-Ground Task Force. Also in
Shipley Thomas, Lieutenant Colonel, USAR, S-2 in Action (Harris-




gence and operations. "Intelligence is not knowledge for
knowledge's sake alone, but for the practical matter of taking
action.
"
St A commander with good intelligence knows the
nature of the terrain his forces must negotiate, the condi-
tions of weather that exist, and how the combined effects of
both will influence his plans. He combines that knowledge
with facts relative to the enemy situation, especially the
critical enemy weakness. The composite enables him to use
available friendly forces to adopt a task organization, scheme
of maneuver, and fire support plan that will achieve a
decisive result. Maneuver forces and their supporting fires
can concentrate in order to achieve relative superiority at
the decisive point, even if absolute superiority is not
possible. Knowing the strength and location of other enemy
forces that can influence the mission permits time-distance
calculations to determine how soon those forces can interfere
with friendly plans. It is equally important to identify what
is not known about the enemy, weather, or terrain. This
knowledge enables the commander to intensify efforts to find
out, or to develop contingency plans that will enable him to
carry out his mission, regardless of enemy actions to inter-
ment, 180.
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fere, or of the influence of weather and terrain/ 1 ' The
initial decision made, the commander uses intelligence during
battle to make further operational decisions appropriate to
changing conditions. Marine Major A.C. Bevilacqua provides an
eloquent summation by stating that, "Bereft of combat intelli-
gence . . . the commander's decisionmaking is reduced to
haphazard guesswork, and maneuver becomes a minuet of the
blind." 60 The functions of command and intelligence are
therefore inseparable; one cannot speak of one without also
addressing the other. The same condition exists as relates to
the commander and his operations officer; one cannot speak of
one without including the other. What is the nature of the
relationship between commander and operations officer, and how
does that affect the relationship between commander and
intelligence officer?
D. THE OPERATIONS OFFICER
The relationship between the intelligence and the opera-
tions officer should be the closest among the principal staff.
It is the commander's responsibility to ensure their relation-
5 'jCommander ' s Guide , 1-1. Also Stedman Chandler, Lieutenant
Colonel, USAR and Robert W. Robb, Colonel, USAR, Front-Line
Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), 18;
Edwin E. Schwein, Colonel, USA, Combat Intelligence: Its Acquisi-
tion and Transmission (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press,
1936), 1.
lj0A.C. Bevilacqua, Major, USMC , "Combat Intelligence in a
Maneuver Environment," Marine Corps Gazette 69 (July 1985) : 61.
35
ship is a harmonious one. Together, the S-2 and S-3 can ease
the burdens of command considerably and significantly influ-
ence the combat effectiveness of the command as a whole. In
spite of the fact that intelligence and operations officers
labor toward the same end, their respective relationships with
the commander are different. Although not the focus of this
study, the operations officer is in a position to influence
the relationship between commander and intelligence officer;
it is therefore important to understand the nature of his
relationship with the commander.
Commanders and operations officers virtually always enjoy
a close relationship, and the bond forms naturally. This is
due in large part to the duties of the S-3, and also to his
personal and professional similarities with the commander. In
peacetime, the operations officer coordinates all activities
that relate to training, planning for exercises and contingen-
cies, combat readiness reporting, and a host of other impor-
tant matters that influence the command as a whole. In
combat, he advises and assists the commander in evaluating the
tactical situation, planning and supervising the tactical
employment of units, and integrating supporting fires with
maneuver; in short, virtually all of the functions that relate
to accomplishing the mission involve the participation of the
S-3. Under almost any circumstances, when issues of staff
planning and coordination arise, the operations officer is
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most often the focal point. In many cases, the commander-
operations officer relationship resembles that between the
commander and the First General Staff Officer (la) of the
Prussian-German command system, where the la doubles as chief
of staff and operations officer, and exercises controlling
authority over the other staff sections. 61 The functions of
the S-3 naturally make him a close adviser to the commander.
They also share many personal and professional similarities.
Excluding the executive officer, the operations officer
is usually the senior member of the staff in terms of grade;
he is also close to the commander in terms of age. Both are
infantry officers and probably have a similar pattern of
previous assignments. For example, most commanders serve as
operations officers at some point prior to command assign-
ments. Bonds form more easily when there is a foundation of
shared experience. Likewise, their long and short-term
professional goals are similar.
Assignment as an S-3 is a major step in an officer's
professional development and frequently leads to command, and
command is what most officers aspire to achieve. The sine qua
non for advancement in the Marine Corps is excellence in
operational art. The best, if not the only way, to gain such
experience is in operations and command assignments. In the
61Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army
Performance, 1939-1945 (Westport, CT : Greenwood Press, 1982), 47.
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more immediate circumstances of planning and supervising the
combat operations of the unit, the operations officer will,
for the most part, be of one mind with the commander and fully
support his plans and policies. The commander will more often
than not consult the S-3 prior to making operational deci-
sions. When the commander goes on reconnaissance, visits
other units, or attends meetings, the S-3 frequently accompa-
nies him; if not, he is supervising operations in the combat
operations center (COC) during the commander's absence.
One seldom observes a commander-operations officer
relationship that is less than satisfactory. From the
beginning, the conditions exist for the formation of a close
and harmonious relationship. Equally seldom does one observe
a principal staff where the S-3 is not the dominant figure.
Even on staffs where the grades of the principal members are
equal, the duties of the operations officer and his close
relationship to the commander elevate him to the status of de
facto senior member. The S-3 is therefore in a position to
influence the commander in many respects, including . his
relationship with the intelligence officer. Whether or not
the influence is positive or negative is completely dependent
upon the personalities and professional qualities of the
participants, especially the commander.
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E. SUMMARY
Command is the exercise of authority over a military unit
by a single officer--the commander. The commander has
authority equal to his responsibility, and he is responsible
for all the command does or fails to do. The commander
delegates authority to members of the staff to advise and
assist him in his command responsibilities. The nature of
command and staff functions forms an inseparable link between
command-inclusive of the operations officer-and intelligence.
Intelligence attempts to reduce uncertainty and risk by
determining unknown factors of three imponderables: the enemy
situation, the terrain, and the weather, as they relate to the
mission of the command. Intelligence is the means by which
the commander can apply maximum combat power at the decisive
time and place to achieve a decisive result; it is the driving
force behind operational decisions of the commander. What
does the record of the past indicate as to how well commanders
fulfill their intelligence responsibilities? How well do




IV. A PERSONAL, INHERENT, FUNCTION OF COMMAND
We must constantly bear in mind the fact that the direction
and supervision of intelligence service activity is a respon-
sibility of the commander. It is part of his personal,
inherent, command function.
Lieutenant Colonel Walter C. Sweeney, USA62
The commander must appreciate and shoulder his intelligence
responsibilities or fail in the discharge of his operational
functions
.
Brigadier General James M. Masters Sr., USMC 63
A. INTRODUCTION
The preceding section outlines the concepts of command
responsibility and staff functions. 'Intelligence is a
function of command; as are operations, logistics, and
personnel. An intelligence officer serves on the principal
staff in order to advise and assist the commander, however,
the ultimate responsibility for success or failure of the
intelligence effort is the commander's. Marine Corps intelli-
gence doctrine states this point precisely: "The commander is
responsible for all intelligence and counterintelligence
b2Walter C. Sweeney, Lieutenant Colonel, USA, Military
Intelligence: A New Weapon in War (New York: Frederick A. Stokes
Company, 1924), 27.
'' !James M. Masters Sr., Brigadier General, USMC, "Minimizing
Uncertainty . . . The Three Headed Spook, " Marine Corps Gazette 42
(June 1958) : 22 . ~
""
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activities of the command." 54 It is only logical then to
focus on the commander. Although doctrine provides detailed
descriptions of the intelligence officer's duties and func-
tions, it contains little discussion of the commander's
responsibilities, other than the line above.
This section of the thesis examines the record of the
past in addressing the following questions: How does the
responsibility for intelligence translate into action? How
well do commanders understand and participate in the intelli-
gence process? A recurring theme is that of responsibility
and authority. The intent of further examining these subjects
is not to fix accountability for problems that occur; neither
is it to discuss specific responsibilities within the context
of the intelligence process. This author has no interest in
the former, and the latter is the subject of examination
elsewhere in the thesis. This section directs attention to
the individual that has authority equal to his responsibil-
ities, and is therefore in the best position to influence
change--the commander.
B. UNDERSTANDING INTELLIGENCE- -THE RECORD OF THE PAST
Commanders dissatisfied with intelligence are most often
those who fail to directly participate in the process. They
do not participate because they mis-understand intelligence
64Commander's Guide , 2-3. Also MAGTF Intelligence , 7-4,7-5
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and the command- intelligence relationship. This is not a
problem unique to the Marine Corps; all services and civilian
intelligence organizations experience the same problem to a
greater or lesser degree. Neither is it an uncommon problem;
Irving Heymount writes that, ". . .no other single factor
[than combat intelligence] has been so consistently ignored
and neglected by unsuccessful commanders." He adds that
successful commanders universally stress its importance and
use. 6 - One would be hard-pressed to find a major or minor
conflict in this century where there did not emerge a percep-
tion among many that intelligence is the least understood
aspect of military operations. Post-war comments by various
authors over the last seven decades clearly substantiate this
argument
.
A regimental intelligence officer in World War I,
Lieutenant Colonel Sweeney writes after the war that, "no
military activity is so shrouded in mystery as that of
intelligence." He attributes the major cause of the problem
to a lack of understanding of the command-intelligence
relationship. In 1936, another veteran of the Great War,
Colonel Edwin E. Schwein also describes the intelligence
S5Irving Heymount, Combat Intelligence in Modern Warfare
(Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Co., 1960), 1; quoted in Rodriguez
Monograph, 4.
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section of the staff as a "mystery to the average officer." 6 *3
The formal staff structure of intelligence was new, generally
mis-understood, and did not produce tangible, visible benefits
during its post-war existence. Accordingly, there was little
support forthcoming for intelligence during the late 1920 's
and 1930 's, when national military preparedness was at one of
the lowest points in our history. Writing in 1948, General
Eisenhower points to the cause of many of the intelligence-
related problems during World War II as directly attributable
to the lack of support for intelligence by senior commanders
between the wars. 67
A group of combat commanders known as the Lovett Board
was convened by the Secretary of War in 1945 to examine
military intelligence operations during World War II. One of
their conclusions states that, "There has been, at all levels,
a lack of understanding of the proper function of intelli-
gence." 68 Lieutenant Colonels Robert R. Glass and Phillip B.
"Sweeney, v, 6; also Schwein, v.
67Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1948), 31-33; quoted in Stephen C.
Conrad, Lieutenant Colonel, USA, "The History of Military Intelli-
gence, " study project for the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle
Barracks, PA, 1989, 6.
68Finding of the Lovett Board, a group of combat commanders
convened in 1945 by the Secretary of War to examine military
intelligence operations during World War II; quoted in Douglas A.
Campbell and Robert W. McKinney, Majors, USA, "Predictive Intelli-




Davidson hold the same view in their 1948 book, Intelligence
is for Commanders : "Perhaps the major intelligence problem of
the last war was that commanders were not "intelligence
conscious." They relate how many German officers would
frequently express contempt for intelligence, believing that
their excellence in operational art would enable them to
overcome any difficulties. By the time their experience on
the Eastern Front had taught them differently, it was too
late; the Germans had ignored operational and strategic-level
intelligence for too long. 69 Ironically, Shipley Thomas
identifies the same problem with the German Army during World
War I. He describes how, during the long years of peace,
combat intelligence had become the subject of neglect.
"Theory, dogma, and schoolroom logic had become, as it usually
does, the substitute for combat intelligence." 10
Marine Captain A.B. Waters, writing after the Korean War,
notes the same trend concerning lack of understanding,
suspicion, and contempt towards intelligence. 71 The attitude
shown on one occasion by a regimental commander illustrates
69Robert R. Glass and Phillip B. Davidson, Lieutenant Colonels,
USA, Intelligence is for Commanders (Harrisburg, PA: The Military
Service Publishing Company, 1948), 39. Further discussion of the
German experience with intelligence during World War II can also be
found in Handel, Intelligence and Military Operations , 22-24.
70Thomas, 4-6.
71A.B. Waters, Captain, USMC , "The Price of Intelligence,
"
Marine Corps Gazette 38 (July 1954): 41.
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this point. The commanding officer of 1st Marines in Korea,
Colonel Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller, was then, and is still a
legend in the Marine Corps. In an intelligence briefing prior
to the high-risk amphibious assault at Inchon, he impatiently
cut his S-2 off and said in part, "We'll find out what's on
the beach when we get there." 72 He made the remark in order
to imbue a sense of confidence in his officers and to diminish
what he describes as, "too much goddamned pessimism" in the
regiment. Although Colonel Puller was properly exerting his
leadership, a similar attitude under different circumstances
could lead to unnecessary casualties, or even defeat. In
1955, Army Colonel Elias Carter Townsend describes the
intelligence system as the subject of frequent "disparagement
and ridicule." Additionally, he states that commanders were
not always appreciative of the capabilities and limitations of
intelligence, neither did they understand the relationship of
intelligence to command. 73
In 1957, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General
Randolph McC . Pate, directed that all general officers place
72Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Colonel, USMC (Ret), Victory at High
Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott
Company, 1968), 77. Heinl cites an interview with Brigadier
General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret) who was in attendance.
General Simmons is now the Director of Marine Corps History and
Museums
.
7iElias Carter Townsend, Risks: The Key to Combat Intelligence
(Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1955), 2.
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the improvement of intelligence high on their list of priori-
ties. The following year, the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence at Headquarters Marine Corps published an article
reinforcing the Commandant's remarks. The article reflects a
balanced appreciation of the command-intelligence relation-
ship, and strikes home on the role of the commander. "A
commander . . . must appreciate and shoulder his intelligence
responsibilities or fail in the effective discharge of his
operational functions." General Masters recognizes the
tendency to overlook intelligence requirements in the Marine
Corps. He states that although the Marine Corps acknowledges
the importance of intelligence, such "lip service" is inade-
quate. He cites an anonymous general officer as attributing
the primary problem to the inertia surrounding intelligence.
General Masters diminishes the impact of his own argument in
the following paragraph, however, by indicating what he
believes to be the salient feature of the Commandant's remarks
the year before: the careful selection of intelligence
officers. This may lead the reader to think that the most
important task of the commander in fulfilling his intelligence
responsibilities is the selection of an exceptional officer as
the S-2. 74 The following year--1959--Brigadier General
74Masters, 22. Masters commanded both 8th Marines and 4th




Cushman writes about closing the gap between intelligence and
operational doctrine. Attributing the first cause of the gap
to "the greater interest in tactics of many commanders," he
applauds the contributions of countless Marines to new
operational concepts and doctrine. Simultaneously, he laments
the absence of officers who can boast of being operational
intelligence experts. 75
Major General McChristian, the Military Assistance
Command Vietnam (MACV) J-2 in from 1965-1967, saw the same
problem manifest itself in a different manner. "Commanders
and staff officers who ask for more information than they need
not only delay the receipt of what they need, but frequently
cannot use what they receive.
"
7t In other words, non-specif-
ic, all-encompassing requests for information divert intelli-
gence personnel and systems from working on the essential
requirements of the commander; thus, the intelligence product
is often of no use because it does not answer those essential
requirements, or is altogether irrelevant.
7SR.E. Cushman, Jr., Brigadier General, USMC, "Closing the
Gap, " Marine Corps Gazette 43 (July 1959) : 50. Cushman was serving
as the Vice President's Assistant for National Security Affairs at
the time he wrote the article. He later became Commandant of the
Marine Corps
.
7tJoseph A. McChristian, Major General, USA, Vietnam Studies:
The Role of Military Intelligence, 1965-1967 (Washington, D.C.:
Department of the Army, 1974), 7.
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In the aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM, much is being
written about intelligence in the Marine Corps Gazette
,
Proceedings , and other professional journals. Typical of the
opinion many intelligence officers share are the remarks of
Marine Major C.E. Colvard. In an article in the Marine Corps
Gazette , he state that, "Many of the operators [sic] are unac-
customed to interacting with their intelligence staff and
display an alarming lack of knowledge concerning intelligence
assets, techniques, capabilities, and limitations." 77 A
research paper by members of the Marine Corps Battlefield
Assessment Team in Southwest Asia also cites similar remarks
after Operation DESERT STORM. Major Colvard' s opinion is
broadly-shared by intelligence officers, and even some
commanders. For example, the report describes one battalion
commander wondering why officers were always asking the S-2
what his plan was for handling enemy prisoners of war (EPW)
;
Command and Staff Action assigns that function to the S-l. 78
Intelligence officers normally give instruction in basic EPW
handling--search, secure, silence, safeguard, and speed to the
"C.E. Colvard, Major, USMC, "Unfortunately, We Fought Like We
Trained," Marine Corps Gazette 75 (September 1991): 20.
78F.D. Houston and P.J. Nagy, Majors, USMC, Intelligence
Operations in Southwest Asia (Quantico, VA: The Marine Corps
Research Center, 1991), 10, Research Paper No . 92-0008 (Part No. 1).
The opinions and conclusions of the report are those of the authors
and do not necessarily represent the view of the Marine Corps
Research Center or any other governmental agency.
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rear--as part of Law of Land Warfare training and to ensure
the EPW are not "spoiled" prior to interrogation. However,
the larger task of attending to their collective security,
administrative, and logistical needs is an S-l function. It
is easy to be critical of individuals unfamiliar with staff
functions and duties by concluding they do not thoroughly
study their profession, and to a certain extent that is true.
Ultimately, however, the commander is responsible for educat-
ing and training his staff. The larger problem of under-
standing and participation by commanders in the intelligence
process continues, but the Marine Corps does little to correct
the problem. The revered status of the commander, particular-
ly commanding generals, discourages constructive criticism
from external sources, and it is the nature of most humans to
not be self -critical ; at least not publicly. Some speak out
in the Marine Corps, but they tend be lower ranking officers.
More recently, intelligence was a major focus of General
A.M. Gray, Commandant from 1987-1991. He did much to try and
improve intelligence in the Marine Corps, but old habits die
hard, and there was little measurable progress. After
retiring in 1990, a Director of Intelligence for General Gray,
Brigadier General Breth, echoes General Masters' 30 year-old
comment relating to the inadequacy of simply acknowledging the
importance of intelligence, indicating the continuing gap
between "lip service" and action. "It is very important that
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we integrate real and not just pro forma intelligence into our
doctrine, training, systems acquisition, and operational
planning." 79 The general stops short of saying that com-
manders are not only responsible for reaching that goal, only
they possess the authority to implement change. General
Gray's efforts to instill the idea that "intelligence drives
operations" was easy enough to accept, but insufficient in
overcoming the intellectual inertia that grips many in the
Marine Corps when it comes to putting the idea into practice.
The inability of the Marine Corps to change beliefs and
practices dealing with intelligence continues today. Since
August of 1990, the Marine Corps Gazette has featured numerous
articles and letters relating to intelligence in general, and
Operation DESERT STORM in particular. 80 If one measures the
gap between commanders and intelligence officers by what is
found in print, it is growing wider instead of closing. The
debate is sharp, and in some cases, contains a bitter tone.
For example, in an interview with Naval Institute Proceedings
,
one general officer writes, "I think it [intelligence] was
terrible, absolutely terrible. . . . and that's just uncon-
79Frank Breth, Brigadier General , USMC (Ret), "C 4 ! 2 : Integrating
Critical Warfighting Elements," Marine Corps Gazette 74 (March
1990) : 48.
8
"See Marine Corps Gazette , August 1990; February, March, June,
September, December 1991; March 1992.
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scionable, as far as I'm concerned." 81 One can suggest that
the same statement applied to the combat performance of a
commander--especially if the commander felt the remark
unjustif ied--would certainly provoke a sharp response from the
intended recipient. The divisiveness such comments provoke is
evident in the defensive tone of the rebuttals which intelli-
gence officers submit for publication . Additionally, virtual-
ly all make the same observation--that commanders and other
officers often do not understand nor participate in the
intelligence process. The very fact that a debate exists over
the responsibilities of command and the functions of intelli-
gence indicates a lack of understanding and command participa-
tion in the intelligence process. One operations officer
concludes in his article, "Years of gaffing off [neglecting]
the intelligence field except when the shooting is about to
start has given us the system we have today." 82
C. PERSONAL ACTION IS REQUIRED
Intelligence staffs and high-technology intelligence
activities developed in the 20th Century. Prior to this
31J.I. Hopkins, Major General, USMC, "This Was No Drill," Naval
Institute Proceedings , 117, (November 1991): 58.
32C . L . Armstrong, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC (Ret), "Surviving
the Storm: Will We Learn the Right Lessons from the Gulf War, "
Marine Corps Gazette 76 (March 1992) : 41. Colonel Armstrong




century, commanders were, for all intents and purposes, their
own intelligence officers. The nature of intelligence
activities was primarily that of exploiting information from
such sources as spies, prisoners, deserters, cavalry scouts,
and captured documents. Commanders would personally direct
collection activities; receive the information directly from
the source; perform the analysis themselves, or in consulta-
tion with their senior commanders; and disseminate the
intelligence, usually in conjunction with combat orders. 83
There was no question as to who was responsible for intelli-
gence. There were no "intelligence failures" in those days;
there were only commanders who did or did not use intelligence
well. The two functions were inseparable. Intelligence
failures are unique to the 20th Century, coincident with the
rapid growth of intelligence organizations and capabilities.
A formal staff structure for intelligence in the U.S.
military came about during World War I; at the same time there
were major technical breakthroughs in intelligence. General
Pershing, adopting the staff organization of the French and
British, made the decision to add intelligence sections to
33Recommended readings include: Conrad, Rodriguez, and Victor
M. Rosello, Jr., Major, USA, "The Origins of Operational Intelli-
gence," study project for the School of Advanced Military Studies,
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KA,
1989.
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military staffs at all levels. 84 Although wire-tapping of
telegraph lines was in practice for some time before World War
I, the expansion of communications technology gave rise to
signals intelligence and to more rapid dissemination of
information. Additionally, the widespread use of aircraft led
to the development of an aerial photography capability. The
means available to the commander for the collection of
information were growing, and so was the need for a staff
officer to assist the commander in the performance of his
intelligence responsibilities. How did these developments
affect the requirement for the commander's participation in
the intelligence process, if at all? Post-war comments from
1918 to 1991 provide an answer.
Among the earliest books on the subject of military
intelligence appeared after World War I. The author, Lieuten-
ant Colonel Walter Sweeney, describes the commander's respon-
sibility for intelligence as that of collecting and evaluating
information of the enemy and disseminating it in the form of
intelligence to higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters.
Although the intelligence officer and his personnel assist him
in the discharge of those duties, direction and supervision of
their efforts is the responsibility of the commander. "It is
" 4Conrad, 4.
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a part of his personal, inherent, command function. 8 '
Authors writing about combat experiences during World War II
reflect the same view. Lieutenant Colonels Glass and Davidson
state it one sentence: "The final responsibility for securing
the information and intelligence which he must have in a
particular situation, and upon which he must base decisions
that will enable him to accomplish the mission regardless of
what an actual or possible enemy may do, rests upon the
commander." 86 Comments from the intelligence officer for the
MACV joint staff are similar: "... given that the intelli-
gence officer has done everything in his power to obtain the
facts, the commander must either become personally involved in
the effort to obtain the information, or if a decision is re-
quired, accept the uncertainty in the lack of information as
part of the nature of war." 87 Also from the Vietnam experi-
ence, a Marine intelligence officer writes, "If the commander
personally participates in the intelligence process, reaction
is assured and positive. . . . Successful results are immedi-
ate." 88 Finally, from Operation DESERT STORM: "Commanders
that were involved in the intelligence process seemed to have
85Sweeney , 27 .
36Glass and Davidson, 66.
i7McChristian, 8.
-R.B. MacKenzie, Captain, USMC, "Intelligence Starts at the
Top," Marine Corps Gazette 57 (July 1973): 40.
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a greater appreciation of intelligence capabilities and made
satisfactory use of intelligence even when that support was
limited. " 89 (emphasis added) These examples reveal few
changes in the commander's role, and illuminate the vital
component of a successful intelligence effort--the direct
participation of the commander.
The authors cited by no means advocate that the commander
personally perform the duties of the intelligence officer;
they state the inherent responsibility for the commander to
take whatever personal action circumstances require in order
to obtain the intelligence he needs. Personal action means
applying the necessary degree of authority and influence the
commander holds by virtue of his office to the accomplishment
of the intelligence mission. It does not include demon-
strating "awareness" of a problem; devoting "attention" to it;
expressing "concern" over the possible consequences; or making
demands for results. It means--when the intelligence officer
is unable to influence others; when he lacks the physical
means necessary to assist the commander; or when the task is
beyond his capabilities or experience--the commander must be
willing and able to personally influence the action. What are
practical examples of these circumstances?
^''Houston and Nagy, 10.
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The above discussion on command and staff functions
points out that staff officers act only in the name of the
commander; they possess no inherent authority over other
principal staff officers, subordinate units of the command, or
officers on other staffs. Their ability to influence events
is therefore solely dependent upon the extent of the authority
and support they receive by extension from the commander.
Without authority from the commander, a staff officer must
rely on the power of his personality to persuade other staff
officers into performing the tasks he deems essential to the
intelligence mission of the command. For example, the
regimental S-2 observes poor light and noise discipline
practices by a battalion he visits in the field. The enemy's
reconnaissance capability is substantial; units that are not
careful about concealing lights at night, or make excessive
noise in conducting routine activities are more vulnerable to
detection by the enemy. Part of the S-2's counterintelligence
duties are to neutralize enemy reconnaissance capabilities, so
it' is within the scope of his duties to bring the matter to
the attention of the battalion intelligence officer. He does
so, but subsequent visits and repeated discussions with the
battalion S-2 yield no improvement in the battalion. The
extent of his influence exhausted, it is the regimental
intelligence officer's duty to bring the matter to the
attention of his commander and urge that he do the same with
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the battalion commander. The influence of the commander is
also important in obtaining intelligence support from outside
the command.
The mission, the nature of the enemy force, and the
characteristics of the area of operations determine the type
of intelligence collection units or systems required to obtain
the necessary information. For example, a regimental S-2
believes that in the current tactical situation, the direct
support of a company from the division's reconnaissance
battalion will be critical to the regiment's ability to
collect information. He discusses the issue with the regimen-
tal S-3, who has staff cognizance over matters pertaining to
supporting units. The S-3 agrees that the reconnaissance
company is critical to the mission. Both attempt to convince
their counterparts on the division staff—the division G-2 and
G-3—and are unsuccessful. The regimental intelligence and
operations officers must now bring the matter to their
commander. If he also recognizes the need for the reconnais-
sance company as being critical, it is his responsibility to
convince the division commander. The influence of his staff
officers to obtain the means necessary to accomplish the
intelligence mission is not enough in this case; it requires
personal action on his part. This is also true when the
commander finds his intelligence officer lacking the experi-
ence necessary to function as effectively as he should; the
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commander must take a personal part in the professional
development of the officer.
Intelligence officers frequently serve as principal staff
officers for the first time in what is also their first
intelligence assignment. For example, second lieutenants
directly from The Basic School and the Marine Air-Ground Task
Force (MAGTF) Basic Intelligence Officer's Course occasionally
receive initial assignments as battalion S-2s; several such
officers found themselves in combat during Operation DESERT
STORM within months of assuming their new duties. The
practice of assigning a second lieutenant as a battalion S-2
in order to "break him in" occurs frequently enough that the
absurdity of it is often overlooked. A corollary would be the.
assignment of a second lieutenant right out of The Basic
School and the Infantry Officers Course--about seven months
training--as the operations officer of an infantry battalion;
it is unthinkable. The same situation often occurs for first
lieutenants and captains who change specialties, or "lateral
move" to intelligence; they may not have had previous experi-
ence on a staff, in addition to this being their first
assignment as an intelligence officer. Their performance
under such circumstances will vary with individual ability,
but it a safe assumption that all will require a greater or
lesser degree of guidance, instruction, and assistance from
the commander at some point. Such is the case with virtually
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any subordinate, regardless of their grade, assignment, or
experience level
.
Whatever the reason, lack of experience in an S-2 is a
situation that the commander can correct under all but the
most urgent circumstances. Furthermore, it his duty to
personally take part in doing so. The combat doctrine of the
Marine Corps--FMFM 1: Warfighting - -states , "Commanders should
see the development of their subordinates as a direct reflec-
tion on themselves . " 90 (emphasis in original) It serves no
useful purpose--neither is it fair to the command as a whole
or the officer in question--to simply demand better perfor-
mance from an inexperienced S-2, without also providing him
the opportunity and support necessary for professional growth.
The commander may provide guidance and assistance personally,
arrange it through an acknowledged expert, or ensure that the
knowledge and experience of the officer develop through
additional training and education; how he does it is immateri-
al. It is a leadership responsibility he must fulfill to the
limit of his abilities and resources.
If the problem is systemic, commanders must individually
or collectively exercise their inherent power and influence to
implement change. The root cause of the problem may be
inadequate doctrine, dysfunctional organization or procedures,
'"'Warf ighting , 51.
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or personnel assignment policies; it may also be shortcomings
in realistic unit training exercises, or the nature of basic
intelligence training. Whatever the problem is, commanders
must be the force behind the solution; intelligence officers
lack the authority and influence to do so themselves.
Intelligence officers may draft doctrine; recommend tables of
organization and operating procedures for intelligence units;
and provide significant advice on the intelligence aspects of
unit exercises and training; however, a commander must approve
all of these actions. Any large organization such as the
Marine Corps may be somewhat slow in implementing change;
however, when commanders clearly articulate a requirement
essential to combat effectiveness, then relentlessly pursue
their goal, change takes place more rapidly. Without the




The most fundamental principle relating to the responsi-
bility for intelligence is that the commander view it as a
"personal, inherent command function." Intellectual acceptance
of that concept is essential to overcoming obstacles of any
nature that impede the acquisition of intelligence the command
requires, and is the major step toward a harmonious and
effective command-intelligence relationship. The record of
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the past indicates that commanders frequently do not take that
view, therefore they do not understand, nor do they partici-
pate in the intelligence process; dissatisfaction, and perhaps
unsuccessful operations are often the result. Fundamental to
understanding their responsibility for intelligence is the
realization that only they possess the authority to implement
change. There will be occasions where, due to his status as
a staff officer, his professional abilities, or the nature of
his personality, the influence of the intelligence officer
will be inadequate to the task. The commander must be capable
of recognizing those occasions--or heeding the call for help
from his S-2--and personally taking action as circumstances
dictate. He cannot share responsibility for success or
failure; it is his alone.
By comparison to the observations of authors in the
opening paragraphs of this section, the pro forma statement
appearing in current doctrine-- "The commander is responsible
for all intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the
command" --appears passive and distant. There is no direct
call for personal action or participation of the commander in
the intelligence process. Those that will argue that none is
needed--that the implication in that single statement is not
only clear, but suf f icient--argue against the record of the
past. Are there indications that doctrine reinforces these
practices?
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V. THE INFLUENCE OF DOCTRINE
The G-2/S-2 is the sole architect of all facets of the
intelligence effort, (emphasis added)
Fleet Marine Force Manual 3-20:
Commander's Guide to Intelligence
19 91 91
A. INTRODUCTION
Doctrine is general guidance that establishes a particu-
lar way of thinking about how a military organization will
fight a war; its purpose is to provide a basis for mutual
understanding among the members of the organization and a
foundation for harmonious actions during war. Although it is
authoritative, it is not prescriptive; doctrine requires
judgment in application. 92 In his book Command, Control, and
the Common Defense , C. Kenneth Allard uses the term doctrine
in the context of a services' "historical reactions to roles
and missions . . . " 93 In view of discussion so far in this
study, it is an especially fitting interpretation. Although
the application of doctrine may be uneven in practice, its
'"Commander's Guide , 2-6.
92 Ibid., 43.
93C. Kenneth Allard, Lieutenant Colonel, USA, Command, Control,
and the Common Defense (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990),
228.
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importance cannot be underestimated; the substance of doctrine
is the basis of instruction in professional schools; for many,
that experience forms a lasting impression.
This section of the thesis examines doctrine in order to
determine its influence on commanders understanding of, and
participation in the intelligence process. Does doctrine
reinforce the concept of intelligence as a "personal, inherent
function of command?" Does it encourage the commander's
participation in the intelligence process? Furthermore, are
there indications that the phrasing of doctrine can have the
effect of shifting the tacit, or inferred, responsibility from
the commander to the intelligence officer? If so, what
manifestations of that occurrence support that view?
Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 3-21: Marine Air-Ground
Task Force (MAGTF) Intelligence Operations describes intelli-
gence doctrine in the Marine Corps. It contains detailed
descriptions of intelligence organizations, procedures,
capabilities, and limitations. Another manual, FMFM 3-20:
Commander's Guide to Intelligence , condenses MAGTF Intelli-
gence
,
providing commanders an overview of essential material.
The documents mirror each other in form and substance, but
there is considerable difference in the degree of emphasis on
the responsibilities of the commander; for some reason, MAGTF
Intelligence is more specific than Commander's Guide in this
regard. Commander's Guide , because of its title and brevity,
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is more likely to be read by commanders, however, and is
therefore the focus of discussion.
B. NO CALL FOR PERSONAL ACTION
The first paragraph in any document is critical to the
reader's perception of the entire work; it often makes the
difference between the reader continuing or setting it aside.
It provides the spirit of the document. The introductory
paragraph in Commander's Guide (and in MAGTF Intelligence )
states in part, "Success of the intelligence effort will
depend upon command awareness and appreciation of intelligence
as an element of combat power." 94 This statement is of
utmost importance, yet it is incomplete and lacking in
emphasis
.
It is important because it identifies a primary, histori-
cal weakness of intelligence— lack of understanding on the
part of commanders. It is incomplete because it is lacking a
phrase that calls for the direct participation of the command-
er in the intelligence process; participation that is critical
to success. It lacks emphasis because the phrase "command
awareness" is ambiguous and subject to interpretation. Use of
the word "command" in this context can mean the commander; the
command as an organization; or both. "Awareness" to some can




mean familiarity with elementary concepts of a subject; to
others it can imply a working knowledge which permits deeper
understanding of more complex issues. Commander's Guide (but
not MAGTF Intelligence ) further diminishes the importance of
the statement by making it a parenthetical remark. In
addition to more effective phrasing--and based upon the record
of past events as pertains to the level of understanding and
participation of commander's in intelligence matters--such a
statement deserves to stand alone, in large, bold print. One
example could be the following:
Success of the intelligence effort will depend upon the
direct participation of the commander, his understanding
of the capabilities and limitations of intelligence in
reducing uncertainty and risk, and his appreciation of
intelligence as an inseparable element of command and
combat power.
This revised statement immediately makes it clear that
the commander's direct participation is essential to success.
No less important is the requirement that the commander under-
stand the practical limits of intelligence personnel, proce-
dures, and systems in reducing uncertainty and risk. This
prevents expectations from exceeding reality, and permits a
more effective relationship with his intelligence officer.
The last phrase establishes in the reader's mind that intelli-
gence is an inseparable function of command and forms the
basis for operational decision-making that results in decisive
combat actions. As it stands now, in the opening paragraph of
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the two documents officers will most likely refer to on the
subject of intelligence, the commander's role in intelligence
appears passive and distant. This theme runs consistently
throughout the Commander's Guide .
The phrase, "The commander should be aware . . . , "
appears frequently in Commander's Guide , keeping the door open
for ambiguity and misinterpretation. Like "awareness, " use of
the word "should" can imply a sense of probability, expecta-
tion, or conditionality , as well as a sense of duty or
obligation. For example, the following sentence appears on
page 2-2 in Commander's Guide : "The commander should be aware
that certain conditions will directly influence the nature of
intelligence operations." Omitting the phrase in question
results in a statement that more effectively captures interest
and encourages more thorough understanding: "Certain condi-
tions will directly influence the nature of intelligence
operations." In addition to not actively encouraging the
commander's participation in the intelligence process,
Commander's Guide provides little guidance as to his practical
responsibilities. The manual provides a great deal of
information about the intelligence officer's duties; it does
not adequately answer the question, "What are the commander's
responsibilities?
"
A close reading of Commander's Guide reveals directive
comments which delineate specific responsibilities of the
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commander. Several sections contain statements which more or
less accomplish that purpose; however, only two stand out.
The first is found under "Intelligence Training," and states
"Intelligence training is the responsibility of all command-
ers." Appropriately, it is the first sentence of the subpara-
graph entitled "Responsibility." 9 " The other is under
"Amphibious Operations." This chapter clearly lists the
responsibilities of the Commander Landing Force; they virtual-
ly mirror image tasks the intelligence officer performs in
assisting the commander, but the authors correctly cite them
as responsibilities of the commander. 96 The authors of
Commander's Guide diminish the importance of other specific
references to responsibility by unobtrusive placement within
the text; by statements immediately following which may cause
the reader to relax his attention to the subject; by the
absence of substantive, amplifying guidance; or by a combina-
tion of these conditions. Can the phrasing and wording of
doctrine have the effect of shifting in the reader's mind the
responsibility for intelligence from the commander to the
intelligence officer?




C. TACIT RESPONSIBILITY SHIFTS
The authors of Commander's Guide appear reluctant or
hesitant to directly confront the issue of responsibility.
The first indication that the commander directs the intelli-
gence effort is found on the fifth page of text in Commander ' s
Guide , in an unlikely paragraph entitled "Intelligence
Requirements .
"
Intelligence requirements are derived from the mission.
Successful fulfillment of those requirements provides the
commander with timely, integrated, all-source intelligence
that enhances the accomplishment of the mission. The com-
mander, through the G-2/S-2, directs the intelligence
effort. Based on knowledge of the enemy, weather, and
terrain, the G-2/S-2 develops intelligence requirements to
support the commander's concept of operations. 97
Thus, the important concept of the commander personally
directing the intelligence effort is in an unobtrusive
location in the text. The sentence is interrupted by a
qualifying clause which diminishes the significance of the
concept and dilutes the commander's inherent responsibility.
The following sentence effectively diverts the tacit responsi-
bility for the determination of intelligence requirements to
the intelligence officer. There are three kinds of intelli-
gence requirements; essential elements of information (EEI),
other intelligence requirements (OIR) , and basic requirements.
The importance of the commander's participation in determining
requirements—primarily EEI--is the subject of discussion in
,7 Ibid., 2-1.
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the final section of this thesis. Ideally, intelligence
officers are proficient enough to determine what EEI are
important to the mission, but even the best S-2s cannot always
figure out what is important to the commander. Remember from
the first section of this study that he sees the world in a
light totally different than anyone else in the command; he
must clearly state what is important to him. Finally,
substantive guidance as to how the commander ("through the G-
2/S-2") directs the intelligence effort is completely absent.
Another significant example is in a paragraph entitled
"Considerations for Intelligence Operations." On balance, it
contains useful advice for the commander. Primarily it
discusses the uniqueness of intelligence work; that it deals
with more unknown, variable quantities in an environment over
which it has less control than any other staff section.
Because of the inherently unpredictable nature of the enemy,
uncertainty, and friction in war, it encourages commanders to
create an environment in which the S-2 is not afraid to take
risks in forecasting or predicting enemy activity.'" The
paragraph contains sound wisdom, to be sure; however, it too
falls short of the mark. There is no practical guidance other
than, "foster the unique environment in which the intelligence





realize that intelligence is an inexact science, and he
[the commander] must accept some uncertainty."" There is no
guidance that suggests how the commander might influence the
intelligence effort through direct participation when, for
example, the S-2 reaches the limit of his influence with
others, his means, or his depth of experience. More impor-
tantly, it suggests that the intelligence officer completes
the intelligence process alone and in a vacuum; there is no
rejoinder that the ultimate responsibility for the synthesis
of intelligence upon which he bases operational decisions is
the commander's, and his alone. This reinforces the idea that
the wording in doctrine is such that it shifts the tacit
responsibility for the command function of intelligence to the
intelligence officer.
Finally, the subparagraph following "Commander's Respon-
sibilities" addresses those of the intelligence officer. It
states in part, "The G-2/S-2 is the sole architect of all
facets of the intelligence effort." 100 (emphasis added) This
single statement can have the ef f ect--perhaps more so than any
other statement or subtleties in wording--of shifting the
tacit responsibility for the command function of intelligence




in the comments and actions of commanders and other officers
relating to intelligence.
D. MANIFESTATIONS OF THE TACIT SHIFT
There are a surprising number of officers in the Marine
Corps today who believe that the problems associated with
intelligence are problems for intelligence officers to solve
alone. A general officer addressing the Class of 1991 at the
Marine Corps Command and Staff College in the spring of that
year was highly critical of intelligence during Operation
DESERT STORM. At the conclusion of his remarks he said, "You
intelligence officers out there have a lot of work to do." 101
Another general officer--an aviator--speaking to the Amphibi-
ous Warfare School, Class of 1988, was questioned as to how
the Marine Corps would fill the gap in tactical aerial imagery
when the only squadron capable of performing the mission--
VMFP-3, flying RF-4B reconnaissance Phantoms--was to be
deactivated prior to the acquisition of a replacement system.
His curt response was that it is a problem for "you intelli-
gence guys to figure out." 102 An officer who served as a
regimental S-2 in Southwest Asia states, "... the intelli-
gence community as a whole needs to look in the mirror and see
itself honestly, looking to itself for solutions rather than
101 Interview with an officer student who was in attendance
102 Personal experience of the author.
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blaming the mirror, and those who bought it, for the defective
image it reflects." 103 A retired colonel writes in part,
"One hopes that the intelligence community would devote as
much attention to where it has gone wrong as it devotes to
passing off the blame." 104 These statements are surprising
in view of the fact that intelligence officers have no
inherent authority. Additionally, if one accepts that
intelligence is a function of command and therefore the
responsibility of the commander, these statements equate to
criticism of commanders and their failure to "appreciate and
shoulder their intelligence responsibilities." Finally, they
are indicative of the divisiveness present in the command-
intelligence relationship today. What other practices might
lead one to believe that the tacit responsibility for intelli-
gence often shifts to intelligence officers?
In the early summer of 1991, an intelligence conference
sponsored by Headquarters Marine Corps convened in Quant ico,
Virginia to identify problems with intelligence during
Operation DESERT STORM. The message announcing the conference
encouraged the attendance of commanders and operations
officers in order to obtain their perspective of events. One
103R. Scott Moore, Major, USMC , " Self -inflicted Wounds , " letter
to the editor, Marine Corps Gazette 76 (March 1992) : 21.
104J.J. Edson, Colonel, USMC, "A Look At What's Really Wrong,"
letter to the editor, Marine Corps Gazette 76 (March 1992): 20.
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regimental commander- -from the 1st Marine Division in Califor-
nia—set time aside to attend the conference. 105 No other
commanders or operations officers attended. A conclusion one
could naturally draw from this is that for all of the criti-
cism levied on the intelligence effort during Operation DESERT
STORM, and in spite of encouragement from Headquarters Marine
Corps, only one commander deemed the conference important
enough to warrant his attendance.
Finally, there is often a competitive, rather than a
cooperative relationship between many commanders and their
intelligence officers. This symptom manifests itself most
readily in the after-action analysis of intelligence "fore-
casts," or "predictions." How close was the S-2 in his
prediction to what actually took place on the battlefield?
Such critiques overlook two fundamental facts. First, it is
impossible for anyone to predict events on the battlefield
accurately and consistently; theories of war from Clausewitz
to Warf ighting recognize this fact. Yet, the practice
persists of evaluating intelligence officers based on their
ability to accomplish that which is impossible. There is no
faster way to lose the loyalty and respect of an earnest
subordinate than to expect the impossible from him, provide no
10SInterview with the commander who attended, Colonel J. A.
Fulks . Colonel Fulks commanded 4th Marines during Operation DESERT
STORM.
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guidance or support, then lay the blame for failing to attain
that goal on his shoulders. Such cases are leadership
failures of the highest order.
Second, it is the commander who performs the final
synthesis of intelligence upon which he makes decisions. It
is his prerogative to accept in whole, in part, or completely
reject the conclusions of the S-2 . Once he makes his deci-
sion, however, the intelligence estimate of enemy capabilities
becomes his, and not the intelligence officer's. Marine
Lieutenant Colonel Morosoff, a former artillery battalion
commander, agrees. "If a commander fails to take the neces-
sary precautions against an attack and is surprised because
his intelligence officer said the enemy would delay, not
attack, the commander, not the intelligence officer, is
responsible." 106 According to Army Majors Campbell and
McKinney, virtually all of the 48 generals who participated in
a 1948 study--many with combat command during World War II--
also agree. Lieutenant General Manton S. Eddy, the commandant
of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College that year,
sent out questionnaires soliciting comments as to how these
commanders and their intelligence officers evaluate the enemy
situation. One of the respondents, General of the Army Omar
N. Bradley, states that although the commander and G-2 may
10bMorosoff, 66-67.
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differ, "It is still his [the commander's] responsibility to
make proper decisions and he cannot blame his G-2 if that G-2
listed capabilities in the wrong order." Commander of the
90th Infantry Division and XIX Corps during the war, Lieuten-
ant General Raymond S. McLain expresses his view in more
fundamental and forceful terms: "Any commander who will be
misled by erroneous conclusions is not capable of command
anyway . " 107
The practice of analyzing intelligence estimates in
hindsight, then providing stinging criticism because events
turned out differently than "forecast," must cease. Such a
practice ignores the impossibility of the task to begin with,
then demonstrates a failure to accept responsibility for what
is an inherent function of command. The result is a competi-
tive, rather than a cooperative relationship between commander
and intelligence officer; one that provokes divisiveness and
is counter-productive to the teamwork so essential in combat.
The preceding examples are representative of the more perva-
sive attitude held by many officers that the problems of a
separate and distinct entity known as the "intelligence
community" are problems for intelligence officers to solve.
Doctrine merely reinforces current and past tendencies.
107Campbell and McKinney, 57.
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The introduction to this section states that doctrine
forms the substance of instruction in professional schools.
One measurement of the importance the Marine Corps attaches to
a given subject could be the number of hours of instruction
provided in professional schools. Shlomo Gazit, former
Director of Military Intelligence for the Israeli Defense
Force, states "The commander must learn, from the lowest level
upward as he rises through the ranks, how to work in coopera-
tion and direct liaison with intelligence." He continues by
saying that, "The subject of intelligence and its related
staff work should have an important place in every military
school or course." 108 How well does the Marine Corps heed
such sound wisdom? The initial training period for second
lieutenants of five and one-half months at The Basic School
includes two and one-half hours of intelligence instruction.
It is the lowest amount of time afforded any of the major
subject areas, and less than .2 percent of the total number of
training hours. By comparison, personnel administration
receives 17 hours, while military justice and legal matters
receive 25 hours. Amphibious Warfare School is a nine-month
school for captains. Not including threat briefings on
specific countries, intelligence instruction amounts to
10aShlomo Gazit, "Intelligence Estimates and the Decision-
maker, " in Leaders and Intelligence , ed. Michael I. Handel (London
Frank Cass & Company, Limited, 1989), 268.
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approximately 17 hours, or about two percent of total training
time. Command and Staff College, also a nine-month course,
but for majors, includes instruction comparable in number of
hours and percent of total instruction to Amphibious Warfare
School; about two percent. 109 If the Marine Corps still
believes that "intelligence drives operations," it does not
reflect that belief in the amount of time devoted to the
subject of intelligence in professional schools for officers.
E. SUMMARY
Doctrine as represented by the Commander's Guide does
nothing to reinforce the concept of intelligence as "personal,
inherent, function of command." The authors appear to be
cautious in their wording and reluctant to drive the point of
command responsibility home. Commander's Guide neither
contributes to understanding nor encourages direct participa-
tion. There are further indications that subtleties of
phrasing can have the effect of shifting the tacit responsi-
bility to the intelligence officer. Comments and actions by
many officers today support the view that intelligence is
somehow distinct and separate from command; that problems in
the field are for the "intelligence community" to solve alone.
Such a view ignores fundamental facts relating to responsibil-
^'''The curriculum offices of the respective schools provided
this information.
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ity and authority of the commander and further erodes the
vital bond that must exist between commander and intelligence
officer
.
What doctrine says about the commander's responsibilities
in the intelligence process lacks any substantive guidance as
to how he can fulfill those duties. What modifications to
doctrine will assist commanders in understanding and partici-
pating in the intelligence process, and in recognizing the
importance of their clear and timely guidance?
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VI. CONTROLLING THE DIRECTION OF INTELLIGENCE
Information is the soul of morale in combat and the
balancing force in successful tactics. Yet in an era of
warfare which on the whole is extremely enlightened . . .
we have not found the means to assure an abundant flow of
that most vital of all combat commodities--information
.
S.L.A. Marshall
As usual, the common soldiers knew little about their





According to MAGTF Intelligence , the primary function of
the commander in the intelligence process is "controlling the
direction" of intelligence activities. 112 That said, MAGTF
Intelligence then fails to define what that means; the reader
is left to derive meaning from the text. It is, however, one
step better than Commander's Guide , which does not contain the
statement at all. Controlling the direction of intelligence
means guiding its focus of effort in the intelligence cycle.
Why is the commander's guidance so important? What is the
intelligence cycle? As doctrine provides no specific assis-
110Marshall, Men Against Fire , 92.
1H Sa]er, 226.
u:;MAGTF Intelligence , 7-5.
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tance, what are examples of how the commander controls the
direction of intelligence? In answering the last question,
the thesis examines two phases of the intelligence cycle and
related events during Operation DESERT STORM.
B. COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE IS CRITICAL
Guidance from the commander is critical to the success of
the intelligence effort for two principal reasons. First, no
staff officer can always know what is important to the
commander, nor should he be required to guess. The commander
takes decisions in view of many factors; intelligence,
friendly capabilities, pressure from senior commanders (who in
turn may be under pressure from civilian authorities),
responsibility for the mission and the welfare of his men, and
even personal ambition. The intelligence officer does not
feel these influences in the same way. The commander must
communicate his concerns and intent in as much detail as time
and circumstances permit. Lieutenant Colonel Morosoff, author
of the Battlefield Assessment Team's report on command and
control during Operation DESERT STORM, highlights this in his
report and relates it specifically to intelligence. Warf iqht-
ing
,
he says, recognizes the difficulty in explaining tasks to
those who must accomplish them; direct communication improves
mutual understanding of the task. He points out that "these
passages are widely quoted, but usually thought of as pertain-
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ing to conveying instructions to those who attack the enemy
rather than to those who develop intelligence ..." When
those requesting specific intelligence products met directly
with intelligence personnel to explain their requirements,
successful results were the norm. He goes on to say that as
intelligence becomes more centralized, the requirement for
face-to-face communication will increase. 113 Shlomo Gazit
adds that this communication is not one way; " . . .a process
of response, interrogation, and correction is to be desired .
a misunderstood question cannot provide the required
answer . " 114
Second, relating specifically to intelligence, the
commander who is familiar with and close to the problems of
the intelligence officer can enjoy certain advantages his S-2
may not possess. Sherman Kent states that, "His [the command-
er's] near view of the broad aspects of the problem and his
remoteness from the fogging detail and drudgery of intelli-
gence work may be the very thing which permits him to arrive
at a more accurate synthesis of what the truth is than that of
113 Peter Morosof f , Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, Marine Expedition-
ary Force Command and Control in Southwest Asia (Quantico, VA:
Marine Corps Research Center, 1991), 19, Research Paper #92-0005.
The opinions and conclusions in the report are those of the author
and do not necessarily represent the view of the Marine Corps
Research Center or any other governmental agency.
114Gazit, 268.
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the intelligence officer. " 11S This can be true in the
search for a solution to any problem, not just that of
analysis and synthesis of information. The commander's
singular perspective of the problem stems from the responsi-
bility of command; he must communicate that perspective to the
subordinates who will execute his will. Also, his detachment
from the details of staff work often permit him to see
solutions more rapidly than others. Continual guidance from
the commander is therefore essential.
Flexibility and creativity are especially important in
providing guidance. It is relatively easy to entangle oneself
in peacetime organizations
,
procedures, and habits; commanders
must ensure this does not happen with intelligence. Within
the bounds of common sense, the technical limitations of
equipment, and the physical and professional capacities of the
humans involved, there is no requirement to adhere to any set
formula or prescription for success. Attempts to conform to
peacetime practices when the mission and circumstances call
for innovation and change will be less than effective, and
probably dysfunctional. S.L.A. Marshall writes in Men Against
Fire that, ". . . by a rough approximation: 60 percent of the
art of command is the ability to anticipate; 40 per cent of




preconceived idea that has been tested and proved wrong in the
crucible of operations, and to rule by action instead of
acting by rules.
"
Ub Prior to suggesting ways in which the
commander can guide the focus of effort, one should possess an
understanding of the intelligence process.
C. THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE
The intelligence process, or "cycle," is not a rigid
procedural checklist, blindly adhered to under all circum-
stances; it is simply a description of sequential events that
must occur to produce intelligence. The intelligence cycle
consists of five phases: direction, collection, processing,
production, and dissemination. These phases are sequential
for any given intelligence question, or requirement; however,
it is a continuous process. The first phase is direction.
Direction includes determining intelligence requirements;
planning collection activities to answer those requirements;
issuing orders and requests to organizations that are capable
of collecting the information; and supervising the progress of
collection activities. The second phase is collection;
acquiring the information and delivering it to the requesting
unit. Processing--the third phase--consists of preparing the
information for conversion into intelligence: recording it;
converting its form, if necessary; and collating it into
"''Marshall, Men Against Fire , 10:
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groups of similar or related data. The fourth phase is
production. Information becomes intelligence during this
phase of the cycle. Production includes analyzing the
information to isolate significant elements relating to the
mission of the command; evaluating the information for its
pertinence, reliability, and accuracy; and interpreting it to
determine its significance and meaning. When this is com-
plete, the data is no longer information, it is intelligence.
The fifth and final phase--dissemination--consists of deliver-
ing intelligence that is pertinent to the receiving unit and
in time for the unit to act upon it. The means of dissemina-
tion should afford a degree of security consistent with the
ability of the enemy to intercept it, and with the sensitivity
of the intelligence. The production of intelligence results
in the issuance of combat orders; a new mission creates new
intelligence requirements, and the process continues.
Avoiding the danger of becoming so specific as to be
prescriptive, what are some examples of how commanders control
the direction of intelligence activities throughout different
phases of the intelligence cycle? A detailed discussion of
each phase is not the intent of this discussion; additionally,
much is already written about the collection, processing, and
production of intelligence. The focus of the following
discussion is on direction and dissemination. These are
traditionally weak areas in terms of participation by command-
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ers ; they afford the greatest opportunity for his participa-
tion and influence to achieve a decisive effect.
D. GUIDING THE FOCUS OF EFFORT- -DIRECTION PHASE
Perhaps the most important phase in terms of the command-
er's guidance, it is in this phase where the commander states
his intelligence requirements and priorities in the form of
essential elements of information (EEI) . Essential elements
of information are "critical items of information regarding
the enemy and the environment needed by the commander by a
particular time to make a logical decision . . . ii117 For
example, an EEI during Operation DESERT STORM was to determine
if the Iraqis would employ chemical weapons.
Iraqi employment of chemical weapons would significantly
influence friendly operations. There was the potential for
massive casualties; a tremendous loss of tempo in allied
offensive operations while units underwent time-consuming
decontamination procedures or bypassed contaminated areas; and
political and higher-level military dilemmas relating to
retaliation in kind, or more draconian responses. Conse-
quently, determining the Iraqi capability to employ chemical
weapons was an EEI. Critical components of that EEI were to
determine how soon the Iraqis could exercise that capability





mines were all possibilities. Indications and warning of
impending attack permits units to adopt a higher degree of
chemical defense readiness, thus reducing casualties. Knowing
the means of delivery may permit a preemptive strike or enable
more appropriate protective measures to be put into action.
Essential elements of information are the commander's
priority intelligence requirements and define the intelligence
mission of the command; EEI drive the intelligence effort.
Although the intelligence officer frequently assists the
commander in formulating EEI, the commander is the approving
authority. Commanders must avoid the tendency to list every
missing item of information as an EEI; if need to know becomes
confused with nice to know, the collection effort weakens and
diffuses by diverting scarce collection assets to non-essen-
tial tasks. Additionally, when a commander asks for every-
thing instead of just that which is essential, he may get his
wish and later find it is one he regrets. The following
example illustrates this point.
The technical ability of our nation and its military to
collect information is so impressive it appears to be exceed-
ing human ability to process it into intelligence in time for
it to be of use. A striking comparison exists between Third
Army operations in Europe during World War II and I MEF in
Operation DESERT STORM. December 1944 was a busy month for
the Third Army message center and code room; elements of
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Patton's Third Army were in the process of relieving the
surrounded 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne. The message
center processed a total of 7,007 incoming messages, and the
code room decoded 2,278 incoming messages; total for the Third
Army in the 31 days of December--9 , 285 incoming messages to
all staff sections. 118 It should be noted that Third Army
had under its control roughly three units the size of I MEF
during Operation DESERT STORM. By comparison, the I MEF G-2
section alone was receiving approximately 3,000 messages a day
during Operation DESERT STORM; during the ground offensive the
number rose to 6,000 a day. According to the I MEF G-2,
Colonel Lucy, "the magnitude of information, the message
traffic, processed by the G-2 section on a daily basis I
found, personally, to be staggering." 119 As a result of the
tremendous increase in the ability to collect information, the
processing, analysis, and synthesis of enormous amounts of
information into intelligence is much more difficult, the main
problem being that of separating the relevant from the
irrelevant. Thus the reason for commanders to specific in
their requests for information and the need to focus on
essential elements of information.
118Floyd J. Davis, Lieutenant Colonel, USA, "The Staff: Another
Dimension of the Operational Level of War," study project for the
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1988, 91.
"'Houston and Nagy, 3.
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The authors of Front-Line Intelligence / Lieutenant
Colonel Chandler and Colonel Robb, describe a perfect example
of clearly-stated commander's guidance in the direction phase
of the intelligence cycle. During the stubborn German defense
of Brest in World War II, a U.S. regimental commander gave his
S-2 one EEI--locate every German machine gun and mortar on the
regimental front. Within 24 hours, the S-2 was able to give
the commander an aerial photograph mosaic depicting all known
positions, and all likely positions reported inactive in the
last 24 hours. 120
Another example, at the most basic level, demonstrates
the importance of commanders establishing priorities in the
direction phase. This example also illustrates how the
commander must consider intelligence requirements that are
important to the entire command, not just to him in his role
as commander. During Operation DESERT STORM, front-line
Marines were constantly requesting color photos or drawings of
Iraqi and allied uniforms and distinctive insignia. The
ability to identify their enemy is a fundamental intelligence
requirement for Marines. In this case, Marines also had to be
able to distinguish between friendly Arabs and hostile Arabs.
Repeated requests for the product by tactical level intelli-
120Chandler and Robb, 56.
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gence officers went unanswered
.
1J1 It was no one's priority
intelligence requirement at the higher levels. The inability
to satisfy such a fundamental requirement for those who must
execute the commander's will is a glaring demonstration of
failing to establish priorities on intelligence requirements,
a task only commanders perform.
The determination of intelligence requirements is a
dynamic process; changing conditions of battle will dictate
new requirements, often very quickly. Although the S-2
frequently anticipates many of the commander's questions,
developments can take place without the S-2's knowledge. No
matter how close in physical proximity and working relation-
ship the commander is to his S-2, he can never assume the S-2
is thinking of the same intelligence requirements in the same
priority as is he. He must tell the S-2, and further expect
the process of "response, interrogation, and correction" in
clarifying the requirement. If clear and timely guidance is
lacking in the beginning, the intelligence product will often
be incomplete, inaccurate, or late. Early guidance is
especially critical in ensuring that the intelligence process
has time to run its course and disseminate the intelligence in
time for it to be of use. Many point to dissemination of
^Personal experience of the author
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intelligence as a continuing problem and the cause of many
intelligence "failures."
E. GUIDING THE FOCUS OF EFFORT- -DISSEMINATION
The goal of dissemination is to provide pertinent
intelligence in a timely and secure manner and in a form
usable to the receiving unit. If any of these conditions are
not met, than the entire effort will not be as successful or
effective as it should, and may even be a complete waste. Two
recurring problems in this area demand the commander's
participation and influence. The first involves the physical
means of dissemination, and the second concerns support to
subordinate units. Both relate to priorities which the
commander establishes.
There are numerous means available to disseminate
intelligence, most of them involving electronic transmission;
secure telephones, radios, satellite communications, computer
networks, and digital imagery transmission devices are some
examples. They transmit intelligence rapidly; by adding
encryption devices they meet the criteria for security; and
the intelligence product they transmit can be readily "tai-
lored" so it is pertinent to the receiving unit. A major
problem in electronic dissemination is that units closest to
the fighting usually possess the most austere capability for
receiving intelligence through that medium; voice radios are
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about all one will see at the battalion or regimental level,
especially in a fast moving tactical situation. This austere
capability precludes the dissemination of lengthy messages,
reports, documents, imagery, or maps by electronic means.
Although Marine divisions and MEFs possess a more sophisti-
cated and extensive capability for electronic intelligence
dissemination, the requirement still exists for a means to
deliver such items as bulky documents and large quantities of
maps and imagery. Even those materials which lend themselves
to electronic transmission are subject to interference from
several imponderables. Technical equipment malfunctions,
electronic warfare, over-loaded circuits, and battle-damage
can all cause the delay or non-delivery of intelligence.
During Operation DESERT STORM, instances of delay and
non-delivery of intelligence were the result of two factors:
an over-reliance on electronic means of transmission and a
subsequent lack of willingness to vigorously pursue other
means, specifically a responsive courier system. More than
adequate resources were available to provide outstanding
courier service; the will to devote them to the task was not.
There exists the requirement, at all times and places, to have
couriers physically deliver intelligence products. What does
it take to establish such a system?
Courier systems must meet two of the criteria of proper
dissemination: timeliness and security (usability of form and
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pertinence are functions of the intelligence personnel who
prepare the product, not the courier system) . A courier
systems requires the scheduled and non-scheduled use of ground
vehicles and aircraft to deliver (and pick up) things from
dispersed units. Courier systems are not for exclusive use by
intelligence, but can be, if the commander desires. Scheduled
"runs " --daily, for example--are appropriate for routine,
recurring deliveries. Non-scheduled courier runs are essen-
tial for matters of a time-sensitive nature. Non-scheduled
runs require the vehicle or aircraft and its operators must be
standing ready for immediate use and not subject to diversion
for other tasks, if they are to be truly responsive and
effective. Ground couriers are appropriate when time is not
critical, or when air transportation is unavailable. Air
couriers are best for situations when time is a factor, the
terrain is unsuited to rapid ground transport, and there is
wide dispersion between units. The size and weight of the
product to be delivered is a factor in choosing the mode of
transportation, as are such other influences as the weather,
the intervening terrain, and the enemy situation. An effec-
tive courier system will provide for all contingencies so that
delivery of products large and small, priority and routine,
can take place. Although they are relatively secure, courier
systems cannot match the speed of electronic transmission.
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Nevertheless, well-thought out courier systems are good enough
in many circumstances.
Consider a command that produces a high-priority intelli-
gence product normally suitable for electronic dissemination;
the equipment necessary to do so is unavailable for use due to
one or more of the possible reasons listed above. In the time
it may take to repair or replace the necessary equipment; wait
for enemy jamming to cease; or hope a radio net becomes
available, a courier might be able to make the delivery. The
attempt should take place in any event, in case there are
unforeseen difficulties which prevent use of the transmission
equipment. There is no avoiding the fact the a courier system
such as the one described above can require the commitment of
a considerable amount of vehicles, aircraft, and personnel to
implement; it is primarily dependent upon the commander's
willingness to devote the necessary assets so that he can
provide intelligence to subordinates under virtually any
circumstances. It requires not only that he make the decision
to do so, but that he ensure its implementation. Intelligence
officers cannot accomplish it effectively on their own.
Disseminating intelligence actually crosses several
boundaries of staff functions; the S-2 must ensure dissemina-
tion occurs; the S-l has the task of establishing a courier
system; the S-3 has working for him the regimental air officer
who requests aircraft; the S-4 and motor transport officer
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control many of the available vehicles; and the communications
officer establishes the electronic means of dissemination--
radios, facsimiles, computers, etc. --he also controls the
regimental motorcycles. 122 Commitment of any of the person-
nel or equipment necessary for dissemination of intelligence
does not occur without clear direction from the commander as
to the allocation of those resources. Establishing radio nets
often occurs as a function of standard operating procedures,
but implementing a courier system requires the approval of the
commander simply because it is so resource intensive. The
thought that drives the commander's will must be that of a
relentless effort to provide intelligence to all of his
subordinates, down to the lowest level possible. This is the
second major problem area in dissemination.
Timely and accurate reporting up the chain of command
always receives a great deal of emphasis. The same is not the
case for dissemination of intelligence down the chain. This
is the dual responsibility of dissemination. Some of the
difficulties inherent in the task have already been discussed,
but it is further compounded by a complication of human
nature. Once commanders satisfy their personal need for
knowledge, it is left to the intelligence officer to dissemi-
122In the author's regiment, the communications officer
controlled the motorcycle couriers; this may not be a standard
procedure in other units.
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nate the intelligence to the rest of the command. Commanders
will almost always impart new knowledge to their subordinate
commanders; however, broad dissemination to the command as a
whole is one of the intelligence officer's tasks. If this is
not being done, subordinate commanders frequently do not
complain; they know, so why take a chance on upsetting their
commander by complaining about inadequate dissemination? Why
is it so hard to accomplish broad dissemination of informa-
tion?
New information will naturally generate new questions by
commanders; the desire for information in combat is insatiable
and the questions are continuous. The intelligence officer
immediately begins work on answering these new, perhaps urgent
requirements. As his first priority is always to the command-
er, the intelligence officer directs his focus of effort--time
and resources--to satisfying these new requirements. His
ability to simultaneously disseminate intelligence is depen-
dent in large part upon his personal abilities and available
resources; too often these are inadequate. In their desire to
satisfy their personal thirst for knowledge, commanders often
overlook the fact that intelligence officers will answer their
needs first, even if it means forsaking other duties, however
reluctantly. If there are additional problems such as
personnel shortages or organizational deficiencies, they make
this situation worse. The Central Command (CENTCOM) concept
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of intelligence support established by the Commander-in-Chief,
General Schwarzkopf, was to have the service component
commanders provide reporting on specific areas of responsibil-
ity to the CENTCOM intelligence section (J-2) , which consisted
of 40 personnel. General Schwarzkopf required the section to
maintain eight situation maps and provide three briefings a
day. Although the section could adequately support General
Schwarzkopf, it was unable to provide tactical intelligence to
subordinate commands. Additionally, there was a CENTCOM
prohibition on cross-border reconnaissance operations by
tactical units. This prevented I MEF from obtaining tactical
information with its own resources. The MEF G-2 operations
officer states, "They became a consumer [of intelligence]
instead of a producer." 123 General Schwarzkopf's concept had
an influence further down the chain. The I MEF G-2 section
had to satisfy CENTCOM' s requirements and those of the I MEF
commanding general. Additionally, they were working under the
same handicap as the J-2 section; shortage of personnel--only
24. The section was split first to provide two watch sections,
then split again in order to maintain a forward command post.
Given the volume of information they were receivmg--3 , 000-
6,000 messages a day--it was a major effort just to keep the
I MEF commander and the J-2 informed; dissemination to
1JiHouston and Nagy, 4.
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subordinate units suffered accordingly. 124 Information that
went up the chain seldom came back down. This took place even
before the ground offensive began, as the example below
illustrates
.
Deserters can provide a great deal of information
relating to the strength and location of enemy forces and such
less tangible factors as morale and willingness to fight. A
Central Command (CENTCOM) prohibition on cross-border ground
operations did not permit units manning border positions to
obtain such information themselves through reconnaissance, so
deserters were a valued source of information at tactical
level. The tactical information they provide is generally
considered to lose its value after 24-48 hours, thus there is
also a sense of urgency at the higher levels in evacuating the
deserters to the rear. The standard operating procedure
established by CENTCOM was that Iraqi deserters crossing the
border prior to the ground offensive would not undergo lengthy
interrogation by units manning border positions; evacuation to
the division, MEF, or joint interrogation facility was to take
place as soon a hasty interrogation was complete and transpor-
tation could be arranged. Instituting a policy of rapid
evacuation of deserters to higher headquarters is in itself
not wrong; as long as the interrogation reports quickly filter
124 Ibid., 5.
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back down the chain to front-line units. This did not occur,
in spite of the volume of reports produced by the Joint
Interrogation Facility; 125 the immediate information needs of
higher commanders were satisfied, new requirements were
generated, and time and resources were devoted to that effort,
not to dissemination to tactical units. Pushing intelligence
down the chain of command was not a priority set by the
highest level of command, and the effects were felt at the
lowest levels. "As usual, the common soldiers knew little of
their own situation ..."
F. SUMMARY
"Controlling the direction of intelligence" means guiding
its focus of effort. The commander's guidance is critical, as
only he brings together all of the factors that influence
combat decision-making. Also, if he has a near view of the
broad aspects of intelligence, he may be better able to arrive
at solutions to a given problem than the intelligence officer,
who is often too close to the problem. Flexibility and
creativity are important characteristics of that guidance.
Commander's guidance is critical to success of the intelli-
gence cycle throughout each phase, especially the direction
phase in determining requirements; and the dissemination phase
!jCj
David P. Biega, Commander (select), USNR, letter to the
editor, Naval Institute Proceedings , 118, (February 1992), 20-21.
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In general, human beings don't accept the unaccustomed.
Change frightens and upsets them, and they will fight even
to preserve situations they have always detested.
Captain Wesreidau, German Army
Today, as always, the way to overcome all our difficul-
ties in war, large or small, is to be found in the proper
development of the military personalities of officers and
men
.




Several factors of doctrine, organization, and personali-
ty contribute to many commanders' reluctance to accept the
responsibility for intelligence as a personal, inherent,
function of command.
First, there are unrealistic expectations of intelligence
in terms of its ability to eliminate uncertainty. The nature
of war creates an environment unmatched in its complexity.
The influence of violence on human behavior and the complex
interaction of opposing wills makes war an inherently unpre-
dictable activity. The dominant characteristics of war--




form the concept of friction; the force that resists all
action. Uncertainty interacts continually with chance--
unforeseen events which neither side can control. Chance
reduces the accuracy and predictive value of information,
often resulting in unreliable intelligence. Friction is an
inevitable condition of war.
The military genius of the commander is part of the
counter-force to friction. Genius consists of the intellectu-
al capacity to see the essence of a situation, the creative
capacity to devise a practical solution, and the determination
to execute the act. Genius is not a substitute for intelli-
gence. The intuition of the military genius cannot function
without some appreciation of the battlefield situation; it is
neither rash boldness, nor is it guesswork. The military
genius is simply more adept at exploiting information, and
more accepting of the uncertainties of war, than someone of
lesser ability. Intelligence, whether the commander acquires
it through personal reconnaissance or an intelligence service,
is inseparable from genius. Theory applied in combat requires
incredible strength and adaptability in the human instruments
of application.
Second, there is less than a complete understanding of
the dynamics of command responsibilities and staff functions,
and the connection between command and intelligence. The
responsibility of command cannot be shared; the commander is
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ultimately responsible for all his command does or does not
do. The commander may delegate authority to staff officers
who assist him in carrying out his responsibilities; however,
the commander prescribes the limits of that delegated authori-
ty, and the staff officer may not exceed those limits.
The intelligence officer on the staff assists the
commander in reducing uncertainty to the maximum extent
possible. He is the commander's principal adviser for the
collection, analysis, and synthesis of information relating to
three imponderables and how they affect the mission of the
command; the enemy situation, the terrain, and the weather.
Intelligence is the means which permits the commander to apply
combat power at the decisive time and place to accomplish the
mission at the least possible cost. Intelligence does not
exist for its own sake, but for the practical matter of taking
action; it forms the basis for the commander's operational
decisions. Command and intelligence are inseparable.
Third, friction in the command-intelligence relationship
results more from commanders who mis-understand intelligence
and do not participate in the process than any other factor.
Understanding means knowledge which permits coping with more
complex issues of a problem; participation means taking
whatever personal action circumstances require to obtain the
necessary results. Commanders who participate in the process
obtain results and turn those results into operational
102
success. The commander's participation is essential, for he
wields authority equal to his responsibility. Intelligence
officers have no inherent authority; their ability to influ-
ence events is solely dependent upon the extent of authority
and support they receive from the commander. When the
intelligence officer is unable to obtain information because
of limited influence, means, or experience, the commander must
personally take action, or, if a decision is required, accept
the lack of information as part of the uncertainty inherent in
the nature of war. When the problem is systemic, change will
only occur when driven by the power and influence of command-
ers . There is no shared responsibility for the success or
failure of intelligence; the power, influence, and authority
to determine its direction rests with the commander.
Finally, doctrine fails to reinforce the imperative of
intelligence as a personal, inherent, function of command.
Doctrine is filled with cautious wording and reluctance to
drive the point of command responsibility home. Commander 7 s
Guide neither contributes to understanding, nor encourages
direct participation. Subtleties of phrase can shift the
tacit responsibility to the intelligence officer. Comments
and actions by many officers today support the view that
intelligence is distinct from command; that problems in the
field are for the "intelligence community" to solve. Such a
view ignores fundamental facts relating to responsibility and
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authority of the commander and further erodes the vital bond
between commanders and intelligence officers. Organizational
beliefs and practices influence the content of doctrine;
professional schools teach the form and substance of doctrine
and shape the military personalities of officers and men. The
product of these factors is that many officers in the Marine
Corps today do not view intelligence as a personal, inherent,
function of command.
Today, as in the past, achieving success in the command-
intelligence relationship is due more to individual effort
than to established organizational practice. Successful
commanders and intelligence officers overcome the suffocating
effect of myths, misperceptions , and intellectual inertia to
retain their focus on accomplishing the mission with the most
decisive effect on the enemy at the least human possible cost.
In other words, success is dependent upon the personalities of
the individuals. Nevertheless, those commanders and intelli-
gence officers who have less than satisfactory experiences are
not solely, nor even primarily responsible for a dysfunctional
relationship; they are products of organizational beliefs and




B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTION
The Marine Corps must recognize the fact that many
officers fail to accept intelligence as a personal, inherent,
function of command. The record of the recent and distant
past support this conclusion. Those who continue to deny it
and impatiently demand that problems with intelligence self-
correct argue from a position that fails the litmus test of
responsibility and authority. These officers stand in the way
of increased combat effectiveness and are gambling with defeat
and the lives of their Marines. Admitting that a problem
exists is often difficult and painful, but it is a necessary
first step toward a decisive solution.
Doctrine, professional education, and training must
reflect a new emphasis on the command responsibility for
intelligence. Doctrine must impart to the commander the
indispensable role he plays in the intelligence process;
direct that he participate; and provide practical guidance as
to how he can decisively influence the success of the intelli-
gence effort. Education must reflect the new doctrine and
provide officers with more than a familiarity of elementary
intelligence concepts; professional schools must prepare
officers for command by imparting a working knowledge which
permits a deeper understanding of more complex issues.
Officers must learn to take maximum advantage of the capabili-
ties of intelligence, and they must also know that limits
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exist on its ability to reduce uncertainty and risk. Training
must incorporate techniques which realistically exercise the
intelligence system and provide the opportunity for the vital
bond between commander and intelligence officer to form and
solidify. The common theme of doctrine, professional educa-
tion, and training should be that which strengthens and
reinforces the command-intelligence relationship.
Those responsible in the Marine Corps must comprehensively
study and decisively correct the problems inherent in the
vital bond between command and intelligence. Efforts to do so
to date contain a fundamental flaw; the emphasis is primarily
on improving only one-half of the relationship--the intelli-
gence half. Solutions focus on the training and education of
intelligence officers and modifications to intelligence
organization, doctrine, and equipment; however, little has
been done to change broadly-held beliefs and practices that
relate to intelligence. The problems that exist today are not
primarily due to intelligence organization, doctrine, numbers
of personnel, or equipment, for the Marine Corps is capable of
achieving far more with the resources currently available;
they are due more to problems of training and education in the
relationship between command and intelligence. Current atti-
tudes and behavior in the Marine Corps toward the relationship
between command and intelligence represent a major obstacle to
a higher level of combat effectiveness.
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